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.  ----- -----INTRODUCTION 
This  document  endeavours  to put  in  perspective the  industrial  background 
of  the  steel  industry and  to  make  the  case  for  a  policy  of  implementing  a 
restructuring  plan  at  community  Level-
It  should  be  read  in  the  context  of  the  commitment  of  the  member  states 
to  a  restructuring  policy  :  a  document  will  summarize  the  restructuring 
plans  submitted  to  the  Commission  under  the  provisions  of  the  aid  code 
and  will  enable  an  assessment  to  be  made  of  the  efforts done  to date. 
This  analysis  demonstrates  the  need  to develop  a  reconversion  policy of 
the  size  of  the  restructuring  process.  For  this  reason  regional  and  social 
problems  have  been  studied  in  depth,  in  order  to determine  the  community 
contribution  necessary to encourage  reconversion,  which  remains  the 
cornerstone  for  future  employment  prospects  and  growth(1).  The  Commission 
has  decided  to  improve  the  co-ordination  of  the  various  instruments available 
in  this field  and  will  propose,  among  other  initiatives,  new  projects  in the 
context  of  a  second  series of  'Feder'  non-quota  section operations. 
As  a  result  of  the  wide-ranging  and  through  debates on  these  three  contributions 
in  the  Council,  the  Consultative  Committee  and  Parliament  which  will  be  held 
in  the  Last  months  of  1982,  the  Commission,  with  the  support  of  the  various 
organisations  concerned,  will  be  able  to  formulate  the  necessary policies  in 
order  to  meet  the  challenge that  now  presents  itself-
(1)  Report  of  the  Commission  to  the  ECSC  Consultative  Committee  on  the 
reconversion  policy  COM(82)  418  of  29/6/1982-- I  -
SUMMARY 
The  ECSC  Treaty  confers  on  the  Commission  the  task of  defining  the  General 
Objectives  which  provide  guidance  on  the  development  of  the  steel  industry  in 
the  Community.  This  guidance  takes  account  of  the  situation in the  internal 
market,  the  state of  the production installations,  constraints  imposed  by  the 
economic  situation and  the  pressure  of  international  competition. 
The  excess  of  supply over  demand,  pushing  up  costs  and  causing prices 
to  plunge  below  the  break-even point  in many  companies,  and  the  cut-throat 
competition on  export markets  have  seriously eroded  the  financial viability 
of  the  European  steel  industry.  As  a  result  the  Commission  has  had  to  take 
a  number  of measures  designed  both  to  prevent  the  situation deteriorating 
into  a  state of  anarchy  that  could nullify the very  concept  of  a  common  market 
(and  which  is  the  reason  behind  the measures  taken pursuant  to Artic:e  58 
of  the  ECSC  Treaty),  and  to  set  in place  the mechanisms  to  adapt  the  structure 
of  the  industry  to  the  new  situation. 
The  strategy to  be  followed  in this process  of  change will  of  course  have  to  be 
realistic but  the  current weakness  of  the  industry also  demands  a  positive 
orientation. 
It will  be  based  on 
an  analysis  of  the  foreseeable  trends  in  demand  from  the  ma~n user  sectors, 
~n international  competition  and  in production  techniques,  which  are  of 
vital  importance  in  this  context; 
examination of  the  factors  that will  help  restore  economic  efficiency 
and  financial  viability to  the  companies  involved. 
The  structural nature  of  the  crisis  1s  obvious  from  the  foreseeable  development 
up  to  1985  of  the  factors  governing  the  industry's activity.  Beyond  1985 
forecasting  becomes  more  difficult  as  the macro-economic  factors  that  can  play 
an  important  role  are not  sufficiently well  defined  to  allow  their  impact  on 
the  steel  industry  to  be  properly  assessed;  however,  it already  seems  clear 
that  the  situation will not  be  fundamentally different  from  that  foreseen 
for  1985. 
The  foreseeable  balance  between  supply  and  demand  is still very  unsatisfactory; 
despite  the  rationalization that  has  already  taken place,  and,  also,  because  of 
the  improvements  made,  and  needed,  in productivity,  the  surplus  capacity already 
evident  in 1980 will  be  even  greater  in 1985,  if the present  stagnation in  demand 
continues,  if it is not  substantially  reduced  by  the  policy of  restructuring  and 
the  application  of  the  aid  code. 
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rt·~ould.amount to  about  29%  of  crude  steel  production capacity,  and  about  32% 
of finished  product  capacity,  figures which  are  obviously unacceptable if the 
industry  ~s  to  be  economically viable  and  which  certainly cannot  be  offset by 
measures  to  control  the market. 
The  combination of  low  econom~c development  and  the  continuing decline  ~n 
specific  steel  consumption  means  that even  the most  cautious  forecasts  made  up 
to  now  have  to  be  corrected  downwards.  In  1985,  foreseeable  consumption  of 
finished  products  in the  Community  is likely to  be  around  93  million  tonnes 
For external  trade,  the positive net  balance of  trade  ~n ECSC  finished  products 
is  likely to  remain  close  to  12  million  tonnes. 
Whether  expressed  in  terms  of quality or price of  the  products  pass~ng down  the 
I 
chain of  industrial  production,  or  in  terms  of  the  relative yield  on  the 
capital  invested  in plant  and  production,  the  persistance  of  inefficiency 
in  one  industrial  sector will  extend  its influence  over  other  sectors 
hindering their ability to  adapt  and  thus  reducing  the  chances  of  a  general 
recovery. 
A true balance  can be  achieved  only  by  taking parallel  and  interdependent 
action on  the  structures of  the  industry,  in  two  ways:  firstly,  modernization  and 
rationalization to  increase  productivity and  increases  ~n the  production of higher 
value  products,  and  secondly,  stopping  of marginal  plant  so  as  to  mobilize 
capital  and  eliminate  the  surplus  supply that has  repercussions  on  the  whole 
of  the  industry. 
Although definite progress  has  been made  in  the  way  of productivity and 
modernization  (1),  this  cannot  bear its full  fruit  unless  the  closing down  of 
marginal  plant  is carried  farther  than it has  been  up  to  the  present,  or 
even  as  planned  in  the  restructuring  and  redevelopment  projects currently 
being  drawn  up  by  the  companies. 
The  stimulation of  this effort is based  on  the  ways  and  means  offered  by 
the  ECSC  Treaty  to  give  new  impetus  to  an  industry  that  is vital  to  the 
. I. 
(1)  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Counci  1  on  the  steel restructuring 
policies,  COM  (81)  67  final  of  25  February  1981. - III -
1n  the  tontext  of  an  integrated  internal  market. 
Community,{'in addition the  task assigned  by  the  EEC  Treaty calls  for  tighter 
coordination between  the  steel policies  and  the  other  common  policies  and 
activities.  The  latter have  focused  more  and more  on  the  need  to  continue 
the  structural  adjustment  to  the  new  econom1c  and  industrial  context,  as 
re-affirmed  in  the  Commission's  proposals  for  the  establishment  of  an 
industrial  strategy at  a  Community  level  (1). 
The  Commission  must  then  see  that  discipline  1s maintained  to  encourage  a 
sense  of  common  purpose  directed  not  towards  conservation but  towards 
revitalizing the  system. 
To  this end,  competitivity is  the  main  indicator in evaluating "the 
most  rational distribution of  production at  the  highest possible  level  of 
productivity''  in accordance  with Article  2  of  the  ECSC  Treaty.  It is by 
concentrating resources  on  production  strong points  that  the  essential 
improvement  in the  average  competitiveness  of  the  Community  steel  industry 
can  be  attained. 
This  improvement  must  be  measured  against realistic references  in  terms  of 
costs  and  prices.  Over  and  above  the  levels, especially of  prices, 
set in  support  of  the  restructuring effort,  it is  necessary  to  take 
into  account  the  reference  levels established by  the  most  efficient competitors. 
A new  policy must  be  established  around  these  economic  references: 
firstly  by  the  companies  which must  have  the  strength of purpose  to 
bring about  the  convergence  of  strategies,  towards  an  adjustment  to  real 
demand; 
by  governments,  whose  intervention must  be  1n  support  of  the  restructuring 
effort,  as  they  cannot  afford  to  pour  cash  into  supporting  a  fundamental 
structural  inefficiency; 
focussing  all  the  instruments  of  Community  cohesion  (crisis measures, 
aid  code,  financing,  commercial  policy,  regional  and  social  measures) 
more  closely  on  objectives  better  adapted  to  the  needs  of  the  present  situation. 
by  the  governments  and  the  Community  to  implement  reconversion  plans  which 
O.~£indispensible for  employment  and  regional  development. 
In  the  Commission's  view,  it  is  under  these  conditions  that  the  possible  synergies 
between  the  different  parties  involved  can  allow  a  defensive  sectoral  attitui~ to 
be  tr-an~fol"mecl  into  a  steel  strategy  commensurate  with  the  challanges  facing  it. 
(1)  COM  (81)  639  final/2  of  29  October  1981. - 1  -
I. A REALISTIC  AND  POSITIVE  POLICY  TO  REVITALIZE  THE  STEEL  INDUSTRY 
1.  Realistic and  positive  general  objectives 
General  objectives  for  steel based  on  a  forecast  of falling  demand  ~ight well 
be  viewed  as  pessimistic  and negative. 
This  impression must  be  countered by  emphasizing  the nature and  line of 
approach  of  this  document,  which  is  intended  to  be both realistic and  purposeful. 
To  be realistic,  any  analysis of  the  current  situation and  future  prospects 
must  take  into  account: 
general  and  economic  constraints  and  technical  progress  in  the  industry, 
which  set  the context  for  adaptation of  the structure of  the  industry; 
the  interdependence of  the various  industrial  sector~which indicates 
the  lines  to be  followed  in fitting the steel policy  into  an  industrial 
strategy; 
the urgency of  the  problems,  which make  an  order of priority essential; 
the scope of  the questions,  which  requires  the  range of  action  to  be 
extended. 
In  the  turbulent  and  uncertain  economic  environment  of  the  1980s,  it is not 
possible to  be  both realistic and  to  produce  at  the  same  time  highly  detailed 
forecasts  looking  far  ahead,  and valid for  several years. 
Rather,  experience  suggests  that it is better to make  fundamental  qualitative 
appraisals,  which  are  likely to  remain valid over  the years,  but which  themselves 
are  based  on  quantitative analyses  which  are progressively  reviewed.  In  any 
event,  sectoral forecasts  obtained  in this way  can give  no  more  than  the 
general  trend of  the  economic  factors.  This will not  be  sufficient  and  will have 
to  be  backed  up  by  a  much  more  detailed and  specific analysis,  which  must  be 
the responsibility of  the  company. 
Against  this background,  the  general objectives will  therefore be  realistic to 
the extent  that,  without  cluttering up  the analysis with only  seemingly useful 
details,  they  throw sufficient light on  the  general  circumstances  that  constrain 
the activities of the various  parties  concerned. 
With  such  a  gloomy  outlook,  a  policy of voluntary  co-operation  ~s needed  to  put  the 
industry back  on  a  sound  footing,  as  the  solution to  its difficulties  cannot  come  from 
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outside.  This  policy must  take effect at  several  levels  in order  to: 
go  beyond  the restructuring effort already  accomplished,  which  is 
obviously  inadequate; 
ensure  that  this  action  ts  consistent with  a  Community  spirit,  so  that 
any  temptation  to restructure at  the  expense  of  breaking  up  the  common 
market  is  resisted; 
give  further  stimulus  to  reconversion  projects,  which  are vital  features 
of  a  positive strategy  towards  a  better allocation of  resources. 
These  general  objectives  focus  on  the  specifically industrial aspects,  while 
questions  of  research  and  industrial  and  social  reconversion, in  view  of  their  importanc~ 
3i'€Cove,~ed 'Y'two  specific  documents  of  analysis  and  proposals, to taKe  inlo <Kcount: 
the better integration of  horizontal  links  between  the  steel industry 
and  other industries; 
an  industrial strategy approach  that  concentrates  more  on  production 
factors. 
2.  An  order of priority commensurate  with  requirements 
The  realistic and  positive approach  adopted  here means  that,  in  comparison  to 
earlier documents,  the  structure and  content  of  these  general objectives  must 
be  modified in the  light of  the priorities identified. 
The  intolerable structural  imbalance  must  be  rect'ified in  the near  future  ••• 
The  Community's  political commitment  on  restructuring refers  to  the year  1985, 
by  which  time  the steel  industry must  be  viable  under  normal  market  conditions. 
Between  1980  and  1985,  overall  steel demand  is  likely  to  declinesomewhatC1) _the ;slightly 
higher activity in  the various  sectors  being more  than  offset by  a  reduction  in 
specific  consumption  in  the Community,  while  the_positive  balance  of  external 
trade will  also  fluctuate. 
On  the  supply  side,  the  companies  declared  projects  indicate  that production 
capacities will  remain more  or  less  constant,  as  the plant  closures  announced 
are offset by  productivity gains. 
(1) on  the  relatively  optimistic  assumption  of  a  GNP  growth  of  between  2%  and  3% 
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In  1985  surplus  finished product  capacity would  then be  in the region of  48  million 
tonnes,  about  32%  of installed capacity.  This  structural imbalance  is all the more 
indefensible  in that it first made  its appearance  in 1975:  its continuation  over 
such  a  long  period has  tied up  resources  in  a  dangerous  and  costly manner: 
at sectoral level,  because it has  an  adverse  effect on  the conditions 
under which  the steel  industry operates,  thus  impairing  competitiveness; 
at  general  level,  because it hampers  more  or  less  directly adjustments  in 
other industrial sectors,  in particular by  depriving  them  of  the  capital 
they  need. 
That  is why  this analysis  and  these proposals  for  action give priority to  the 
correction of  the structural  imbalance. 
1n  the  face  of  international competition that will become  fiercer 
throughout  the  decade  ... 
After  1985  forecasting  becomes  less precise,  but  is no  less essential. 
The  lack of  long-term references  demonstrates  the difficulty of  economic 
forecasting;  but  in this  context,  the best qualified observers nevertheless 
consider it reasonable  to  project  the underlying  trends  evident  today  for  the 
period up  to  1990. 
Although  this estimation  cannot  go  into  the  same  degree  of  forecasting  detail  as  for 
1985,  it nevertheless  indicates  for  1990  a  Low  growth  in  steel  demand  and  an 
increase  in  the  pressure of  competition  throughout  the  world  :  the  ruling  prices  in 
the  European  market  wiLL  tend  in~vitably to  reflect  the  decline  in  world  prices, 
which  in  term  will  be  based  on  the  costs of  the  most  efficient  world  producers. 
The  standing  and  growth  of  each  steel  industry  will  therefore depend  even  more  on 
its competitiveness. 
In  seeking  a  structural  balance  between  supply  and  demand,  therefore,  care  must  be 
taken  to  improve  the  competitiveness  of  all the  factors  involved. 
An  analysis of  the  key  factors  at  operational  and  strategic  level  can  identify the 
elements  which,  once  the  surplus  supply  is mopped  up,  will  determine  the  competitive 
position  of  the  steel  industry  for  the  rest  of  the  decadeq - 4  -
There  are  many  such  features  and  they  can  be  combined  into  three  categories: 
access  to markets; 
management  of  resources; 
socio-economic  environment. 
It is essential  to  step  up  action at all  three  levelst  as  the  Community 
industry is not  at  the  moment  managing  to  attain a  predominant  position ln 
any  one  of  them . 
. ..  the  strategic  importance  of  Community  cohesion  ls bound  to  increase. 
Leve1s  of competitiveness  are  not  of  course  determined  solely by  the  mechanics 
of  free  competition,  since  several  factors  of  a  commercial  and  even political 
nature  come  into play.  It  is fair  to  say  that  this  will  probably  still be 
true  for  the  steel  industry  in  the  1980s~ 
As  its other  great  rivals  close  ranks  and  new  producers  take  the  offensive~ 
Community  cohesion  based  on  internal  market  becomes  of  even  greater  strategic 
importance  and  political  significance~ 
The  size of  the  internal market  remains  a  vital  comparative  advantage,  while 
the  trade  negotiations  and  industrial  strategies required  to  restimulate  the 
economy  call for  a  mlnlmum  critical mass  well  beyond  the  reach  of  any  individual 
Member  State. 
What  is more,  the  high  degre~ of  interdependence  of  the  national  steel 
industries  and  user  sectors  in  the  Community  is  conducive  to  the  spread  of 
inefficiency as  much  as  the  benefits of  reorganization. 
Consequently  these  general  objectives  deal  with  the  Community  as  a  whole  and 
contain no  details for  individual Member  States. 
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This  is to  avoid  drawing  attention  to questions  which,  without  denying  their 
importance  or  sensitivity, are  of  minor  status  compared  to  the  crucial 
problem  of  the  structural  crisis in  the  common  market~  Until  that  is 
rectified,  all  producers  and  users  will  suffer  because  the distorting  factors 
have  a  snowball  effect,  jeopardizing  the  ability to devise  efficient  recovery 
strategies~ 
3- A wider  political  framework 
In  view  of  the  scope  of  the  challenge to  be  met  and  the  vital  role  that 
Community  cohesion  can  play  in  streamlining  the  industry,  it might  be  useful 
to  recall  the  foundations  of  the  Community  policy_ 
The  institutional  basis  for  the  steel  policy is of  course  the  ECSC  Treaty, 
the  basic  approach  of  which  is surprisingly  up  to  date  considering  that 
it was  designed  with  a  view  to  the growth  of  the  industry~  The  Treaty provides 
that  the  Commission  should  also  react  in  times  of  crisis or  impending  crisis~ 
Fundamentally  the  Treaty  advocates  the  most  rational distribution of  production  at 
the  highest  possible  Level  of  productivity  1  and  forbids  unilateral  subsidies 
being  granted  by  member  states: this might  usefully  be  borne  in  mind  at  a 
time  when  the  industry's difficulties are giving  rise  to over-protective 
and  hidebound  attitudes-
Nor  are  these  attitudes  justified under  the  EEC  Treaty,  on  the  basis of  which 
the  Commission  aims  to  implement  a  Community  industrial  strategy  (1)  for 
adjustment  to  the  new  economic  conditions~ 
The  strengthening  of  the  Links  between  the  steel  policy  and  other  industrial 
policies  is  necessary  for  two  reasons  : 
to  ensure  that  Community  action  in  economic  matters  remains  consistent; 
to  open  up  a  wider  range  of  action  for  the  revival  of  the  steel  industry~ 
(1)  COMC81)  639  final/2  of  29  October  1981~ - 6  -
4~  The  structural  nature  of  the crisis 
Although  the  recession  coming  on  top  of  structural  decline  has  caused difficulties 
for  all  steel  producers  in  the  industrialized countries,  the  Community  industry 
as  a  whole  has  reacted  less effectively  than  its rivals  : 
the  Japanese  industry,  taken  by  surprise  by  the  1973-1974  crisis  i1  the 
middle  of  a  major  expansion  programme,  unhesitatingly  embarked  on  a 
cost-cutting  and  technical  improvement  campaign  which  allowed  it to  expand 
its markets  as  a  result  of  increased  competitiveness.  Nevertheless at 
the  present  time  the  Japanese  government  has  declared  its  industry to  be  in 
a  state of  crises; 
the  American  industry,  less  advanced  technologically  but  with  sound 
financial  backing,  started to  shut  down  plant  in  order  to  keep  capacity 
in  line  with  demand,  but  without  automatically  seeking  to  improve 
productivity at  the  moment:  however  its  capacity utilisation has  fallen  to 
40%  no>~{!. 
The  Community  steel  industry,  which  was  older,  Less  well-located  and  more 
scattered than  in  Japan,  was  unable  to adapt  fast  enough  to  trends  in  demand 
in  both  quantitative  and  qualitative  terms~  Stagnating  steel  output  in  the 
Community,  combined  with  slack  internal  consumption  and  an  industry  not 
competitive  enough  to  increase  exports1  would  not  in  themselves  have  brought 
about  the  structural  imbalance  if at  the  same  time  production  capacity  had  not 
increased  substantially  since  1974,  as  a  result  either  of  specific  decisions 
on  capacity  or  advances  in  technical  productivity. 
The  structural  rigidities  in  the  member  countries aggravated  the  impact  of 
sur-plus  capacity~  Their  slowness  to  adapt  led  to  a  competitive  lag  that 
burdened profitability and  caused  financial  difficulties~ 
The  worsening  structural  imbalance  was  accompanied  by  an  uncontrolled 
escalation of government  aid  and  triggered off  amongst  other  repercussions 
a  pr.ice  war.  This  has  severely  reduced  the  revenue  of alt producers,  even  the 
most  competitive,  thereby  jeopardizing  the  general  prospects  for  the 
streamlining  of  the  industry. 
seeing  that  the  major  part  of  the  industry  was  incapable of  adjusting  on  its 
own  initiative to the  new  market  conditions  without  jeopardizing  all  that  had 
been  achieved  by  the  Community,  the  Commission  had  no  hesitation  in  stepping  up 
its direct  intervention  as  soon  as  the  conditions  laid down  in  the Treaty 
were  met  :  it  had  no  choice  in  the  matter. 
This  determinated  policy  constantly  bore  in  mind  the  need  to preserve  a 
Community  sense of  common  purpose  in  the  effort  to  make  the  steel  industry 
competitive  again  in  the  long  run. - 7  -
5.  Measures  to organize  the market:  an  essential transitional  stage to 
give  the  industry the  resources  it needs  for  restructuring 
At  the  end  of  1980  the  system of production and  delivery  quotas  on  the 
internal market  was  added  to  the surveillance of voluntary restraint 
agreements,  price guidelines,  verification of  the application of price-lists 
(extended  to dealers'  price-lists  in  1981)  and various  measures  concerning 
imports  from non-member  countries,  which  range  from  the monitoring of 
imports,  through  the publication of basic prices,  to  the  conclusion of bilateral 
arrangements. 
a)  Good  results but potential risks 
These measures,  taken  to  give  the  industry the  time  and  resources  it 
needed  for  restructuring while  preserving  the  unity of  the  internal 
market,  provided  relative financial  security even  for  the  least 
efficient  firms  by  pushing up  sales  prices  substantially. 
The  price levels  achieved  in the first half of  1982  allowed  the  average 
firm  to  recover  .. on  average  all  Hs productions  costs,  whereas  earlier 
only  marginal  costs  has  been  co_vered~ 
Although  on  the whole  the crisis measures  may  be  regarded as  successful, 
and  though  the  respect  of  the price  rules  of  th~ Treaty must  be  strictly 
controlled,  the  end  must  not  be  confused  with  the  means~ 
Anticipation of more  balanced market  conditions  as  a  result of  a  voluntary 
policy  has  imposed  special  contraints  on  the  most  competitive  producers  and  on 
steel-using  firms,  i~e~  on  the  two  categories  that  are  essential  to  the 
p~osperity of  the  industry,  because  : 
i)  when  demand  is sluggish,  the  average  competitiveness of the 
industry  can  pick up  if the  market  shares  of  the  most  competitive 
producers  are  increased; 
ii)strict control of production and  artificially high prices  may  cause 
a  later contraction  in demand: 
- by  adding  to  the difficulties  of  the user  sectors, 
- by  aggravating product  substitution effects, 
- by  increasing pressure  from  imports. 
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That  is why  the production  quota  scheme  must  not  become  institutionalized 
or  fom  the  sole  basis of  a  structural  policy,nor  is it  conceivable  to 
continue  treating the  adjustment  of  capacities  over  a  long period as 
a  purely cyclical matter;  not  only would  this  run  counter  to  economic 
logic but it would  also be  contrary  to  the  requirements  of  the  ECSC  treaty. 
Nevertheless,  because  the  structural  impact  of  the  restrictions 
~ncreases the  longer  they  last,  the  only way  of  preventing  this  from 
acting  as  a  brake to  adjustment  is to  introduce  into  this  compulsory 
system  dynamic  factors  that will  encourage  restructuring. 
b)  The  criteria for progressive  development  of  the Community  anti-crisis measures 
Because it is  temporarily  taking over  from  the mechanisms  of  the  free  market, 
Community  supervision  must  increasingly  take  its operating  crite~ia from  them: 
i)  the key  for  production  sharing  cannot  ignore  the  requirements  of 
economic  efficiency.  Elements  of elasticity should  be  introduced  to: 
- integrate the structural  changes  of  markets,  in particular by 
taking more  recent  reference periods  for  calculation of  the 
abatement  rates; 
- compensate  for  the  specific disadvantages  that  the  quota  system 
may  have  for  certain producers,  and  1n  particular  those manufacturing 
a  single product  as  they are unable  to  set off losses  in  one  product 
against benefits  ~n another; 
- take account of  restructuring by  allowing  companies  to adapt  quotas 
in  the  light of their efforts  and  results at the  same  time  ensuring 
that this does  not  occur at  the  expense  of  the  most  efficient firms. 
ii)  the restriction of  production  cannot  reverse  the  underlying 
trend of  prices,  which  in this  industry are  linked  to  cost  movements. 
Over  the period  1974-81,  prices  in real  terms  moved  downwards  by  2.2% 
a  year;  in  the period  1982/1985-86,  there will  most  probably  be  a 
downward  trend of  around  2%  a  year  in real  terms,  due  to  the fall  1n 
unit  costs. 
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Taken  as  a  whole,  measures  to  organ1ze  and  regulate the  internal market 
should  facilitate  the restructuring effort within  the  company,  financed 
by  its own  resources. 
This  effort deserves  to be  supported  in preference  to  stepping  up  government aid  which, 
a~art  from  the  possibl~ effect  of  distorting  competition,  was  not,  before  t~e aid  code 
was  applied;  always  based  on  strictly economic  and  community  criteria~ 
6.  Requirements  and  criteria for  the restructuring policy 
To  ensure  that  government  aid  to  the steel  industry provides  support  for  the 
necessary  restructuring effort,  the  Community  has  established specific rules  on 
aid to  the steel  industry,  alongside  the  introduction of  compulsory market 
discipline.  These rules  also  allow  the actions  of  the member  states  in this 
field to  be  coordinated at Community  level. 
Aid,  which  must  be  degressive,  is allowed  only  up  to  1985,  and  must  be  in 
conjunction with  restructuring programmes  that are consistent with  the 
objectives  of profitability and  reducing  capacity. 
Like  production quotas,  government  aid,  which  must  also  be  oriented  towards 
structural streamlining, will  therefore have  to  create  the  conditions  under 
which it becomes  no  longer necessary. 
a)  Criteria for  the  evaluation of  restructuring plans 
Obviously  the greatest effort must  be  made  by  companies  which: 
- use  the  roost  obsolete  and  anti-economic plants; 
- record the highest  losses; 
- benefit  from  the highest  subsidies; 
-have precarious  market~ as  a  result  of  the  type  of  product  they  maWe  Gr 
dependence  on  exports to third markets~ 
The  criteria for  evaluating  the validity of  restructuring plans  stem 
from  the overall analysis  made  in these  general  objectives: 
i)  Excess  production capacity has  an  impact  on  the  overall viability 
of  the Community  industry more  harmful  than  any  other factor. 
By  cutting back capacity,  it should be  possible  to offset foreseeable 
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capacity surpluses  for  1985,  which  are  of  the  order  of  32%  for  fi_ni shed 
oroducts,  ranging  from  20%  for  cold  rolled  sheet  to  more  th·an  43%  for 
hot  rolled  sheet  and  strip; 
ii)  After  the  upward  adjustment  in  the  first  half  of  1982,  it  is estimated  that 
prices will  continue  their downward  trend  ~n real  terms.  Any  scheme  to 
restore profitability that  does  not  count  on  an  annual  average  fall  of 
at least  2%  in  real selling prices  in  the  Community  up  to  1985  ~s 
unrealistic; 
iii)  As  far  as  costs  are  concerned,  the  downward  trend brought  about  by 
technical  progress will be  reinforced by  the  impact  of  the  enormous 
reserves  of  productivity evident  from  the  gap  opened  up  by  the 
Japanese and,  in  some  cases,  the most  efficient Community  producers. 
In  this respect,  the existence  of  "normative  costs"  (1)  allows  evaluation 
of  the  cost  improvement  hypotheses  put  forward  in  company  plans.  Taking 
an average  for  the  Community,  it is possible  to predict  tnat  costs will 
fall  annually  by  around  2%,  but it is nevertheless  obvious  that  in 
respect of costs,  even  more  than  for  capacity  reduction  and  prices, 
the analysis  and  the criteria have  to  be  adapted  to  the  structure 
of  each  individual  company. 
b)  Contradictions  to  be  avoided  if  the  overall  effort is  to  succeed 
As  a  result of  experience  gained  in  the first phase of  examining  company 
plans  in the  light of  these  fundamental  criteria,  several  contradi~t1ons 
that might  well  jeopardize  the  success  of  the overall  restructuring effort 
can  already be detected. 
Too  many  companies  are  aiming  first  and  foremost  to  improve  profitability by 
increasing  the  use  of  existing  plant,  rather  than  dealing  with  the  problems  caused 
by  Least  efficient  plant.  With  this approach,their  main  objective is to  increase  ~ 
sales  and  take  a  bigger  share  of  the  market, which  involves  several  contradictions: 
- companies  are  counting  on  their partners  to  reduce  capacity  while  refusing 
to do  so  themselves; 
- the  planned  production  increased  woul~ not  be  possible  under  the  quota  scheme 
and  yet  they  still wish  this  scheme  to  continue; 
(1)  "Normative  costs"  are  the  theoretical  costs  of  each  company  on  the  basis of 
the  optimum  use  of  its plant  and  the  prices  of  the  production  factors  at· 
its disposal. - 11  -
- at a  time  of  sluggish or  even declining  demand,  the  relation between 
selling prices  and  sales volumes  is crucial:  sav}ngs  in  ter~ of unit  .. 
costs  from  increased production may  often be  more  than cancelled out 
by  the  resultant  reduction  in selling prices. 
The  companies'  individual  restructuring plans  drawn  up  under  such 
conditions  are  irreconcilable both with  each other  and  with  the 
objective for  the  Community  as  a  whole. 
Taken individually,  these  plans  show  that  the  individual  company's 
profitability will be  restored by  1985.  However,  when  the  capacities 
adopted  in each plan are  added  together,  they  show  a  continuing overall 
imbalance  on  the market,  the  adverse  effect of which  on  prices  -
could  not  be  neutr~lized indefinitely,  and  th~refore the  assumption  that 
the  industry  would  become  profitable  ag~in proves  to  be  iltusory" 
With  the  same  historical  downward  trend,  the  level  of prices is affected by 
capacity levels:  they will  be  sufficient to  cover  total costs,  maintaining 
the  1982  improvement,  if surplus  capacity is abolished,  but  they will  only 
cover marginal  costs if the  surplus  remains. 
To  avoid  this risk,  efforts must  be  stepped  up  in two  directions: 
i)  Companies  must  no  longer  regard prices  as  a  purely exogenous 
factor  since  they,  far more  than  the  Commission,  are  in a  position 
to control  prices  through their capacity decisions.  The 
closing down  of plant must  meet  their own  needs  not  only  1n  prospect 
of cost  reduction but  also  in respect  of  price increases.  Going  beyond 
the micro-economic  viewpoint,  restoration of  balance  in the  sector 
calls for  a  definite  commitment  on  the part of  the  companies. 
· ii) Strict vigilance by  the  Commission  becomes  crucial  in this respectt 
since  the  link between  capacity reduction  and  stable price  levels  will  only 
come  about if company  plans  are  reviewed within the  overall  framework . 
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c)  An  effort  f£O~~hich no-one  lS  a~£omatically excluded 
The  need  for  renewed  efforts,  even  greater  than  called for  by  the earlier 
forecasts,  means  that no-one  can  be  automatically  ruled out,  provided 
that  government  aid  is  granted within  the period  1980-85. 
i)  The  fact  that restructuring was  carried out before  1980,  although 
taken  into account  by  the  Commission,  does  not  mean  that  there  is 
no  need  to maintain  the  momentum  of  this effort.  The  mere  fact  that 
a  company  has  recourse  to  government  aid  shows  that  it still needs 
to  adapt  to market  trends  after  1980  and  that it should  contribute to 
redressing  the  imbalance  of  the  world  market; 
ii)  It is not  possible  to  exclude  financial  restructuring  from  the 
effort  to reduce  capacity  and  include  only  industrial restructuring 
proper.  A sound  investment  policy must  at  least  succeed  in  getting 
back the cost  of  the capital used,  whatever  its origin. 
Consequently  financial  problems  are  almost  always  the  outcome  of  poor 
industrial decisions,  and  therefore  responsibility  must  be  accepted  by  those 
concerned; 
iii)  Since  the priority alm  lS  to  progress  towards  a  balanced  market, 
reductions  in rolled  finished  products  are  essential  and  closures 
further  up  the  line are  no  substitute.  Rather  such  closures  should 
be  additional  since it is at  the  iron  and  steel making  stage  that  the 
impact  on  costs  is greatest. 
iv)  Social  and  regional  considerations  are  crucial:  to  dela.y  r~strl:lcturing 
will  not  resolve  the  problem  of  empl9yment  and  risks  discouraging 
reqional  development.  It  is  ne~essary therefore  to  plan  specific 
initiatives  in  the  field of  reconversion. 
The  excess  capacity  to  be  eliminated  is  so  great  that  even  unsubsidized 
producers  cannot  be  exempted  from  making  a  contribution,  even  if only 
because  they  b~n~fit  from  improved  price  Levels  resulting  from  the  crisis 
measures. 
Although  the  Commission's  role  is  less  compelling  1n  the  case of 
subsidized  companies,  it is nevertheless  far  from  negligible.  Specific 
impetus  will  come  from: 
- dynamic  use  of  production  quotas; 
-Commission's  opinions  on  investment; 
- restructuring  and  reconversion  loans. 
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7.  A revival  strategy 1n place of  a  defensive  policy 
The  Community  aim  1s  to  stimulate the  concentration and  consolidation of 
resources  at  the  strong points.  Far  from  being  a  manoeuvre  to dismantle 
the  industry,  it is the  only revival  strategy possible under  existing and 
foreseeable  circumstances.  These  circumstances  forbid  the  institutionalization 
of  a  defensive policy that 
- would  swallow up  extensive  resources  at  Community  level; 
- would  increase  the  temptation to  take national measures  incompatible with 
the  common  market; 
-would encourage  a  wait-and-see attitude and  reduce  the  industry's  incentive 
to adapt; 
- would  make  wasteful  and  unrewarding use  of  human,  technical  and  financial 
resources  that are  ·~ompetitive with  those of  t~e Community's  most  dangerous 
competitors~ 
Whether  the  aim is to meet  internal  demand  under  optimum  quality and  price 
conditions,  or to  safeguard  jobs  or revitalize regions  affected by  the crisis, 
a  policy of  supporting  sectoral  inefficiency can never  be  successful  in the long 
run. 
a)  Action on key factors 
What  must  be  done  therefore  is to  reverse  the  tendency  towards  managing  the 
rundown  of  the  industry  so  as  to  tackle efficiently the  full  range  of 
key factors  determining  the competitiveness  of  the  Community  steel  industry 
1n the  1980s: 
i)  Demand  must  be  sustained by  a  suitable combination of quality  and 
prices  and  by  aggressive  marketing  based  on  fast  and  reliable 
deliveries,  before  and  after-sales services  and  advice  for  customers, 
increased cooperation with consumers,  and  a  closer association of 
steel export policy with the  flows  of  world  trade; 
ii)  Production management  offers extensive  scope  for  improvement  which 
must  be  used  so  that factor  yield can offset  the  increase  in factor 
prices.  Most  of  the  Japanese  advantage  (which  can provide  a  yardstick 
for  the effort  to  be  put  in)  is not  due  to  factor prices but  to 
productivity.  The  mean  difference  to  be  made  up  on  Japanese producers 
in terms  of  cost per  tonne 
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of steel  was  at  least  15-20%  in 1981. 
These  are  the  lines  to  be  followed  in  strengthening  the  investment 
effort,  seeking  internal  and  external  rationalization and  making 
company  management  more  efficient.  Rationalization of  iron production, 
wider  introduction of  continuous  casting  and  improvement  of rolling 
mill  productivity  should  be  strictly coordinated  so  as  to bring  down  the 
break-even point  and  increase  the  economic  yield of  the  factors  employed; 
iii) The  availability and  cost  of  the  financial  resources  to  back  up  this 
effort will  be  of vital  importance.  Self-financing  should  be  strengthened 
because  supply conditions outside  the  company  will  for  the most  part 
be  governed  by  the  general  conditions  on  the market  which  seem  likely  to 
remain  fairly difficult. 
b)  Increasing  the  impact  of  Community  policies 
The  Community  can play an  important  direct  and  indirect role  ~n improving 
the  factors making  for competitivity in  the  steel  industry: 
i)  Support  for  reconversion will  be  stepped  up.  After  the  introduction 
in  the  "non-quota"  section  fo  the  EEC  Regional  Development  Fund  of  a 
specific  Community  project  to  help  remove  obstacles  to  the  development 
of new activities in  some  steelmaking areas,  the  Commission  ~s, 
amongst  other measures,  to  propose  new  projects  in  a  second  set of 
non-quota  regional  fund  operations. 
The  aspects  of most  immediate  social  relevance  (going  further  than  the 
recently extended  reconversions  loans  and  retraining grants)  will 
later be  strengthened  so  as  to  become  a  specific  component  of  the 
reconversion policy; 
ii)  The  steel  research activities will  be  given  a  fresh  impetus  so  as  to 
provide  a  better link between  the  design  phase  and  industrial applicatioh 
and  to  improve  coordination with  research work  in other sectors; 
iii) The  ECSC  financing  policy will  be  rigorously pursued  and will  be  an'· 
important  factor  in channelling  investment,  diversifying  supplies  and 
giving access  to  international capital markets  on  optimum  terms  or even 
at  subsidized rates. 
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Since  requirements  are  so  vast,  it will  be  necessary  to devise 
and  introduce  necessary adjustments  designed  to  strengthen  the 
att~octivness  of  Community  financing. 
iv)  The  external  commercial  policy  should  bring  about  better integration 
of  the promotion of  steel exports# 
However,  the  overall  prospects  of  the  steel  sector  depend  above all on  the 
success of  a  Community  industrial  strategy and  a  determined  policy of 
stimulating investment.  The  Commission's  thinking on  these matters is 
known,  several  practical proposals  have  already been  submitted  and  others 
are  in preparation;  it is therefore vital  to  bear  in mind  that  sectoral 
activities must  be  consistent with  these  general  objectives. 
Conclusion 
Community  action can  take  many  different  and  far-reaching  forms,  affecting not 
only companies  but  also  their  socio-economic  environment.  The  instruments 
must  be  managed  consistently and  must  be  regarded  as  together  forming  a 
necessary mechanism  for  tackling all aspects  of  the  steel  industry's  problems. 
A spoke  in one  of its wheels,  even if apparently justified by  a  particular case, 
may  reduce  the  cohesion of  the  system and  thereby cancel  out  the effects of 
other measures  whose  individual efficiency depends  on  their being  integrated 
with all  the other elements.  However,  even  though  the  Community  offers  a 
dynamic  framework  to  ensure  that national policies  and  company  strategies are 
consistent,the  recovery of  the  industry steel  depends  first  and  foremost  on  the 
degree  of  commitment  shown  by  the  companies  themselves  and  on  their determination 
to initiate measures  that will  help  to  streamline it. 
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II.  ECONOMIC  TERMS  OF  REFERENCE:  A SOMBRE  OUTLOOK 
1.  A difficult macro-economic  background 
At  world  level,  radical  changes  have  upset  the  traditional monetary,  industrial 
and  trade  balances  over  the  past  ten years  and  have  reduced  general  economic 
growth everywhere.  The  consolidated  indicator  of  international  trade  gives 
a  quantitative  idea of  this malaise  by  way  of  a  reduction in the  volume  of  the 
annual  growth of world  trade,  which  dropped  from  8.5%  from  1960  to  1973  to 
4.5%  from  1973  to  1979,  but  does  not  show  how  much  keener  international  competition 
is becoming  as efforts are  made  to  shore  up  increasingly difficult  internal 
growth.  Looking  ahead,  it seems  likely that all these  factors will  continue  up 
to  1985,  when  the  most  optimistic estimates  predict  an  average  growth  in 
extra-Community  world  trade  of  5%  a  year. 
The  draft fifth medium-term  economic  policy plan for  the  Community  has  painted  an 
economic  picture based  on  low  and  variable  growth rates,  and  has  emphasized 
the  importance of  the  effort to  restore  a  satisfactory development  mechanism. 
In  the  Community,  the  growth  in the  gross  domestic  product,  5%  before  1973,  has 
fallen to  2.5%  since  the  first oil crisis. 
Slower  growth,  falling profits,  pessimism and  uncertainty  about  economic 
prospects  have  resulted  in a  great  decline  in the  development  of  investment. 
Since  1973,  investment  has  increased at  less  than  1%  a  year  whereas  an  annual 
growth rate of  over  5%  had  been  recorded  over  the  ten previous  years.  Although 
investment  is directed mainly  towards  modernization  and  rationalization, 
progress  in the  adjustment  of  industrial production  structures  has  been  inadequate, 
either because  too  little capital  has  been  invested  or  because  there  has 
been  no  genuine  redevelopment  strategy. 
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This  development  is unsatisfactory in comparison with  the  levels  recorded 
by  some  of  our  rivals.  Analyses  conducted  by  the  Commission  on  the 
competitiveness  of  Community  industry reveal  signs  of relative weakness 
compared  to its international  competitors,  and  these  are all  the more 
dangerous  in that  they  extend  over  numerous  sectors,  including  some  high-
growth sectors,  and  affect  several  key  factors  ranging  from  productivity 
to  the  creation of  the  surplus  and  its accumulation. 
Foreseeable  trends  up  to  1985,  if current  tendencies  continue,  are unlikely 
to differ much  overall  from  those  recorded  from  1973  to  1980.  With  some 
progress being made  1n  the battle' against  inflation,  budget deficits  and 
ris.ing unemployment  may  well  prove  major  handicaps  to  the  picking up  of 
internal  growth.  Internationally,  against  a  financial  background marked  by 
tension over  exchange  rates  and  the  concentration of  indebtedness,  the oil 
price  trends may  seriously reduce  demand  from  OPEC  countries,  while  demand 
in industrialized countries might  suffer  from  a  resurgence  of protectionism. 
Under  these  circumstances,  with an  upturn  in 1983,  the  growth of  the  GDP  1n 
the  Community  could  average  between  2%  and  3%  over  the period  1981/1985. 
Investment  could  also pick up  slightly although without  exceeding  the  GDP 
growth rates.  However,  there will  be little increase  in employment,  while 
the deficit on  the  balance  of  payments  could  tend  to  improve. 
Consequently  the world  and  Community  b~ckground gives little reason  for 
excessive  optimism:  it 1s  1n  a  context  of  slackened  growth  that  sectoral 
adjustments  become  both more  difficult  and  more  important.  These  sectoral 
adjustments must  also  be  carried out  consistently in order  to  prevent  them 
from hindering each other  and  to  provide  maximum  stimulus  for  synergies, 
since both are  equally possible in complex  processing economies. 
2.  Slower  development  in steel-using  sectors 
In  a  micro-economic  approach,  the  consumption  of  intermediate  goods  such 
as  steel products is a  demand  governed  by  the  level  of  activity of  the 
user  sectors. 
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After declining  sharply 1n  1975,  the  overall  index  of  activity 1n  the  steel-
using  sectors picked  up  somewhat  in 1976  to  a  level  that  remained  fairly 
steady up  to  1980  (see  Table 1). 
~s  SE 
Preliminary  processing 
Manufacture  of  steel  tubes 
Mechanical  engineering 
Electrical  engineering 
Means  of  transport 
Shipyards 
Manufacture  of  metal  articles 
Building  and  civil  engineering 
(excluding  Italy and 
the  Netherlands) 
Other  users 
(2) 
TOTAL 
INDEX  ~~ACTIVITY IN  USER  SECTORS  CLASSIFIED  BY  NACE  ~1) 
Production  index  1975  =  100 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977 
- 101,3  107,5  118,7  122,5  100  108,9  106,6 
- - - - - 100  100,5  93,5 
- 95,8  94,5  100,4  105,5  100  100,5  100,8 
83,1  86,0  92,4  102,0  106,4  100  106,5  111,4 
- 100,2  104,1  111,9  103,3  100  113,7  119,8 
89,4  98,0  104,4  100,6  87,1  100  112,0  85,1 
- 103,2  101,5  108,0  110,8  100  105,3  106,3 
104,6  105,0  110,7  112,0  107,8  100  99,9  99,6 
102,8  99,4  102,6  107,6  107,4  100  104,3  104,9 
100,8  103,8  10,8  111,2  100  105,5  104,6 
TABLE  1 
1978  1979  1980  1981 
110,7  116,5  110,4  108,0 
103,7  104,8  103,6  114 
100,8  103,7  105,2  1  ~~,  5 
114,5  116,4  120,6  117,7 
122,1  127,1  119,2  113,3 
76,9  64,9  53,0  -
104,2  108,3  108,6  103,7 
(+) 
102,4  103,4  102,2  -
115,1  - - -
107,9  110,7  108,0 
1)  Indices  of  value  added  at  factor  cost,  at  constant  pr1ces,  except. 
- tube  manufacture:  production  indices 
- shipyards  :  compensated  gross  registered  tonnage  indices. 
2)  Weighting:  steel  consumption  in  1978. 
(+)  Estimate over  9  months. 
Since  1976,  the  production  trend  for  all user  sectors has  been weaker  than 
those  for  industrial production and  the  gross  national  product;  this movement 
is both compatible with,  and  complementary  to,  the decline  in the  relative 
share of  investment  in the  GDP  (see  Table  2). 
TABLE  2 
TREND  IN  CONSUMPTION  OF  FINISHED  STEEL  PRODUCTS  AND  BRANCH  ACTIVITIES  IN  THE  COMMUNITY 
Indices:  1975  = 100 
(  X  > 
Index  of  Total  steel  Index 
activity  in  steel  consumption  of  industrial  GDP 
usino  sectors  (,)  production 
1971  100,8  105,0  94,9  90,4 
1972  103,8  115,5  99,1  94,0 
1973  110,8  123,2  106,5  99,5 
1974  111,2  119,4  107;  1  101,3 
1975  100  100  100  100 
1976  105,5  115,3  107,4  1  OS, 1 
1977  104,6  110,3  109,9  107,1 
1978  107,9  109,8  112,5  110,9 
1979  110,7  116,5  118  114,6 
1980  108,0  110,8  117  115,9 
1985  113,5  108,9  127,2 
(1)  Index  ~elghted by  steel  consumpt1on  1n  the  d1fferent  sectors  1n  1978. 
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115,5t 
114,  1C 
110,51 
123,47 
123,60 
69,7 
110,73 
104,1C 
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If  the pressure of  international competition continues,  it seems  reasonable 
to project  these  trends  up  to  1985,  taking  into account  the  general  decline 
in activity recorded  in  1980  and  assuming  a  modest  upturn in 1982-83,  more 
for  technical  reasons  than because  of  a  structural  inversion in the  cycle, 
which will probably not  take  place until  the more  distant future. 
In  shipbuilding,  the  level of activity can be  expected  to  remain fairly poor, 
below  the  1970  level,  although in relative  terms  it will  pick up  on  1980, 
while all other  sectors will  exceed  the  1975  level.  The  best results are 
likely to be  recorded  by vehicle  construction,  about  a  quarter up  on  1975, 
followed  by electrical engineering  and  preliminary processing.  Compared  to 
1980,  mechanical  engineering  and  the manufacture  of  tubes  could pick up  somewhat, 
while  the very low  growth  in the  manufacture  of metal  articles and  building is 
unlikely  to  change. 
This  development  reflects the still cyclical  nature of  the movements  (transport 
equipment),  structural  adjustments  tending  to  concern the  development  of 
services  and  continuing modernization of  the  production apparatus  (electrical 
engineering),  with are-equipment  component  in prospect  (preliminary processing 
and  mechanical  engineering). 
On  the whole,  therefore,  the  foreseeable  outlook for  the  activity of  the 
steel-using sectors does  not  justify any  optimism;  indeed,  it calls for 
additional  caution. 
The  figures  showing  the  changes  in the  indices  are  so  small  that  the margins 
of statistical error normally expected  in this  type  of  exercise could 
change  the  scale  or  even  the  sign of  the variations. 
This  also affects  the  degree  of reliability of  the  comparative  evaluations 
between different  sectors,  which  stem from  general  statistical classifications 
that are  increasingly inadequate  in the  light of  changes  in actual  production  . 
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That  is why  sectoral details,  together with  macro-econom~c information,  can 
provide  no  more  than general  guidance  for  economic  operators.  This  guidance 
cannot  be  sufficient  in itself but  must  be  combined  with  a  much  more 
accurate definition of  the  demand  prospects  by  category of  product  (quality-
price)  in relation to  the  customer  and  the relevant market,  which  can  be  done 
only at  company  level. 
3.  Declining product  consumption  in the  Community 
To  pass  from  macro-econom~c trends  and  the activity of user  sectors  to  the 
consumption of  steel products,  use  must  be  made  of  consumption  functions,  whose 
coefficients are  determined  by  several  factors. 
These coefficients depend  on  two  ma~n components: 
- Structural  component:  growth  in the  GDP  beyond  certain thresholds  is 
accompanied  by  a  reduction  in the weight  of  the  sectors with  the greatest 
steel  consumption,  especially buildlng; 
Technical  component:  technological  progress  combined  with  the variation in 
relative prices determines  the  variation in the  technical  production 
coefficients  ~n the  steel  industry and  in the user  industries,  which also 
use  products  that are  alternatives  to  steel.  Several  factors  already identified 
govern  the  reduction  in specific  steel  consumption;  for  example,  the value 
of most  products  at constant  prices  is  increasing more  than  their weight, 
products having  a  high value  per unit  of weight  are  developing more  rapidly, 
and  modifications  ~n product  design and  production processes  are  bringing 
about  a  reduction  ~n scrap  and  an  increase  in steel yield. 
Taken overall,  the  specific  steel  consumption  functions  therefore  tend  to 
decline  over  a  long  period:  total  steel  consumption  in the  Community  in 1980 
was  less than  in  1972,  despite  an  increase in the  output  of  the user  sectors, 
in industrial production  and  in the  GDP  (see  Table  2). 
By  1985,  this  tendency will  probably  be  confirmed,  because  of its consolidated 
nature which  is virtually independant  of  any  cyclical upswing,  thus  reducing 
still further  the outlets for  Community  steel products. 
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The  combination of  a  poor  economic  situation and  the  continuation of  the 
general  trend  towards  a  reduction in specific steel  consumption makes  it 
necessary to  correct  downwards  the most  cautious  forecasts  made  in 1978  for  1985. 
The  foreseeable  consumption of finished products  in the  Community  for  that year 
should  be  reduced  from  about  110 million  tonnes  as  forecast  in 1978  to  about 
93  million tonnes  (see  Table  3). 
TABLE  3 
CONSUMPTION  OF  FINISHED  PRODUCTS  IN  THE  COMMUNITY,  BY  SECTOR 
<'DOD  DOD  tonnesl 
Mean  annual  variation  Mean  annual  variation 
Forecast  between  1978  and  1985  between  1978  and  1985 
1978  1985  with  a  constant 
on  specific  consumption 
Preliminary  processing  21,1  22,5  0,93  0,62 
Manufacture  of  steel  tubes  14,7  15,9  1,15  1,37 
Mechanical  engineering  7,0  7,2  0,44  1,33 
Electrical  engineering  2,7  2,4  -1,41  1,08 
Shipyards  1,4  0,9  -6,03  -1,39 
·vehicle construction  11,0  9,6  -1,94  +0,20 
Building  and  civil  engineering  9,2  8,6  -1,09  0,24 
Manufacture  of  metal  articles  19,9  19,4  -0,31  0,87 
Other  users  6,9  6,5  -0,83  0,37 
TOTAL  93,88  93,0  -0,13  +0,73 
The  impact  of  the  reduction 1n  specific consumption  is far  from negligible:  the 
average  annual  variation in total  consumption  between  1978  and  1985  is likely 
to be  -0.13%  compared  to +0.73%  which  would  be  attained if specific consumption 
remained  constant. 
The  trend  in demand  will  then  be  negative  in most  sectors  (electrical engineering, 
shipyards,  means  of  transport  and  building);  this will not  be offset  by  the 
increased consumption  in preliminary processing  and  the manufacture  of  tubes 
and  the  sustained  level  of mechanical  engineering  and  the manufacture of metal 
articles. 
On  the basis of  the  breakdown  of  consumption  by  product,  it 1s  possible  to make 
some  forecasts  on  the  effect  that demand  trends will  have  on  the  product mix  in 
the  steel industry,  and  from  there  to  give  some  guidance  on  production  structures . 
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On  the  two  ma~n conventional  product  groups,  flat  products  should  continue 
to  record greater growth  than bars  and  sections  (see  Table  4). 
TABLE  4 
CONSUMPTION  OF  FINISHED  PRODUCTS  IN  THE  C~MMUNITY,  BY  PRODUCT  CATEGORY 
('000  000  tonnesl 
Mean  annual  variation 
1974  1975  1977  1978  1979  1980  1985 
85178  85/80 
Molten  steel  2,0  2,0  1,7  1,6  1,6  1,6  1,4  - 1,33  - 2,05 
Ingots  and  semis 
Tube  ingots  2,4  2,3  2,7  1,5  1,4  1,3  1,2  - 3,48  - 2,46 
Other  ingots  and  semis  8,9  8,0  8,3  8,4  9,8  8,7  8,4  - 0,01  - 0,75 
TOTAL  11,3  10,3  11,0  9,9  11,2  1 o, 1  9,6  - 0,49  - 0,97 
Finished  rolled  eroducts 
Heavy  sections  7,1  5,9  6,1  6,6  6,8  6,6  5,7  - 2,06  - 2,92 
Merchant  bars  19,5  17,0  17,6  16,2  17,2  17,8  15,5  - 0,67  - 2,  77 
Wire  rod  10,6  8,.2  9,6  9,8  10,9  10,2  10,3  + 0,62  + 0,14 
Hot-rolled  strip  7,7  5,3  6,1  6,4  6,4  5,4  4,6  - 4,47  - 3,11 
Plate  ::.---3  mm  19,3  17,1  16,9  17,9  17,5  17,4  +  0,47  - 0,10 
Sheet  -< 3  mm  18,2  18,3  19,1  19,3  17,4  19,0  - 0,02  + 1,84 
Coated  sheet  6,3  6,9  7,4  8,1  8,0  9,5  +  3,58  +  3,36 
TOTAL  88,6  73,0  81,6  82,4  1:16,7  83,0  82,0  - 0,06  - 0,23 
GRAND  TOTAL  102,0  85,4  94,2  93,8  99,5  94,6  93,0  - 0,13  - 0,34 
Amongst  flat products,  demand  is likely to  be  particularly sustained  for  sheet 
(less  than  3  mm  thick)  and  coated  sheet;  over  the  period  1980-85,  annual  growth 
rates  could  be  around  1.8  and  3.4%  respectively.  Consumption  of  heavy  plate 
should  remain  at  the  1980  level,  while  strip  could  decline  by  3%. 
Amongst  bars  and  sections,  demand  is likely to fall  appreciably for  heavy 
sections  (-2.9%)  and  merchant  bars  (-2.8%),  while wire  rod  consumption  should 
remain  stable,  confirming  the  levels  recorded  since  1979. 
4.  The  world market  and  foreign  trade:  slower  development  rates 
Standardized  technology  and  products make  the  steel  industry  a  "world" 
industry,  which  is regarded  everywhere  as  a  necessary basis  for  industrial 
development. 
. I. 
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The  world  steel market  is characterized by very keen  competition against 
a  background  of declining demand  and  structural  imbalance. 
The  world  surplus  in production capacity is accompanied  by  marked  geographical 
differences  in supply  and  demand  trends.  As  a  result there is an  enormous 
marginal  supply  that aggravates  the  fluctuations  in the  steel cycle. 
On  the  demand  side,  the movement  of  stocks  is of vital  importance  because of 
the  increase  in both its relative significance  and  its variability.  Alongside 
speculative buying  encouraged  by  the  instability of  exchange  rates,  there  1s 
the  impact  of  the  emergence  of new  countries actively engaged  in trading 
and  the effects of protectionist manoeuvring. 
The  growth  in world  steel  demand  slackened  off in the  1970s:  in the  second half 
of  the  decade  it recorded  an  annual  average  growth rate of  about  2%  compared 
with 5%  earlier  (see  Table  5). 
WORLD  STEEL  PRODUCTION  AND  CONSUMPTION  <'OOD  DOD  tonnes) 
Production  "  annual  Apparent  consumption  "  annual 
(crude  steel  equivalent)  average  growth  (crude  steel equivalent)  average  growth 
1980  1985  198D  1985 
1975  1980  1985  1975  1980  1975  1980  1985  1975  1980 
·-
Western  Europe  29,4  33,8  35,0  + 2,8  + 0,7  36,2  3~,5  35,0  - l ,0  +0,3  (excluding  EECl 
Eastern  Europe  192,7  209,2  22D,O  + 1,7  + 1,0  194,7  210,4  220,0  +  1,6  +0,9 
Africa  7,8  1  D, 7  13,0  +  ~,6  + 4,0  13,~  15,9  18,0  + 3,5  +2,5 
Middle  East  1,2  2,7  5,5  +17,9  +15,3  14,5  17,0  20,5  + 3,2  +3,8 
Japan  102,3  111,4  11D,O  + 1,  7  - 0,3  64,8  7~,3  80,0  + 2,8·  +1,5 
China/North  Korea  26,8  42,9  50,0  + 9,9  + 3,1  31,4  49,1  54,0  + 9,4  +1,9 
Rest  of  Asia  12,5  24,5  32,0  +14,5  +  s;5  21,4  37,8  46,0  +12,1  ·~,D 
U S  A  105,3  101,7  110,0  - 0,  7  + 1,6  115,8  114,8  124,0  - 0,2  +1,6 
Canada  13,0  15,9  17,0  + 4,1  + 1,3  13,3  13,3  13,5  - +0,3 
Latin  America  18,6  28,8  34,5  +  9,1  + 3,7  29,6  36,6  37,0  + 4,3  +0,2 
Oceania  8,1  7,8  ts,S  - 0,6  + 1,  7  6,4  7,0  B,O  + 1,8  +2,7 
E E C  125,2  127,7  124,0  + 0,4  - D,6  98,6  103,8  103,5  +  1,0  -o,  1 
TOTAL  643,0  716,1  759,5  + 2,2  + 1,2  640,1  714,5  759,5  + 2,0  +1,2 
Product  definition:  Un1ted  Nat1ons. 
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The  factors  governing  the  new  trend  in  the world  steel  trade  since  1974  appear 
likely to continue  their impact  in  the  years  ahead. 
Some  structural  components  are  already clear: 
- the  increasing  importance  in  terms  of  both production  and  consumption of 
the  newly  industrialized countries  and  the  developing  countries; 
- the  surplus capacities at world  level,  and  more  particularly in the 
industrialized countries; 
the  renewed  restructuring effort made  by  the main  producing countries, 
especially Japan. 
The  reference  framework  exhibits more  uncertainties  than  optimistic  signs. 
Three  types  of factors  appear  likely to  combine  in bringing  about  a  particularly 
difficult environment: 
- in  the  period  1980-85  the world  economy  may  now  be  expected  to  slow down, 
while  prospects  beyond  1985  will  be  governed  by  constraints  as  yet  undetermined; 
- the  instability of  exchange  rates  has  a  direct  impact  on  a  product 
normally quoted  1n  dollars  on  world  markets; 
- government  intervention  to  provide  aid  or  to  protect national markets 
sometimes  seriously affects  trade  balances. 
In  this climate,  for  the  period  1980-85,  world  steel  consumption  and 
production  (ECSC  and  non-ECSC  products)  are  likely to  record  annual  growth 
rates well  below  the  average  for  the  second  half of  the  1970s,  with a  fall 
from  +2%  to  about  +1%. 
Steel  production  and  consumption  forecasts  in the different  world  submarkets 
can  be  used  to  draw  up  a  reference  framework  within which  the  various 
producers will  probably have  to  act  (see  Table  5). 
Other  Western  European  countries 
Here  a  small  increase  in supply  and  demand  and  a  balanced  situation in  1985  can 
be  predicted.  Although  the  current  restructuring in Spain  and  Sweden  should 
reduce  capacity,  some  increase in production is  to  be  expected 
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~n Yugoslavia  (Smederevo)  and  in Turkey  (Iskenderum),  while  the  doubling of 
capacities  in Portugal  has  been  postponed  to  1986.  Consumption  may  be 
expected  to pick up  in Spain,  where  it remains  extremely  low,  and  in Portugal. 
Eastern Europe 
Some  expansion of  capacity is planned,  especially in Rumania,  Bulgaria and 
East  Germany.  Even  if the  objectives in the plans  are  not  fully attained in 
those  countries,  it seems  realistic to  predict overall  an  increase of  around 
11  million  tonnes  for  1985.  A similar rise  in consumption also  appears  probable 
as  some  expansion of industrial  production,  especially in the  way  of durable 
consumer  goods,  is expected  in the  USSR. 
Latin America 
It is not  so  much  production as  internal  consumption  that will  suffer  from  the 
slowing  down  of  development  and  the  serious difficulties with  the  external 
debt.  The  steel  trade deficit  in  1985  would  thus  be  reduced  to  one  third 
of its level  in 1980. 
Africa 
The  recession  ~n the  industrialized countries  and  the  external  debt  of  several 
African countries,  which has  reached  an  alarming level,  are  likely to  bring about 
some  slackening of  the  production  and  consumption  growth rate for  1985. 
Japan 
With  production  remaining  steady,  a  small  increase  in consumption  should 
result  from  the  expected  growth  in  investment  and  consumption  in  the  private 
sector.  Although  seriously reduced,  the  Japanese positive balance  of  trade 
would  remain  the  largest of all. 
China  and  North Korea 
The  annual  growth  in consumption  for  1980-85  (one  third that  recorded between 
1975  and  1980)  should  be  justified by  the  fact  that  China,  despite  the  downward 
revision of the  objectives for  the  1976-85  plan,  is still a  large  expanding 
market  and  per capita steel  consumption  is still amongst  the  lowest  in the 
world. 
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Rest  of Asia 
The  forecasts  of  higher  production have  been greatly reduced  following  the 
decision by  China  Steel  Corporation of  Taiwan  to  postpone  indefinitely phase  3 
of  its expansion programme,  which  would  have  increased its crude  steel 
capacity  from 3.2  to  5.7 million  tonnes,  Also  the~e is still great uncertainty 
about  the dates  on  which  the  steel development  plans  1.n  lndia will  be  put  into 
effect. 
United  States 
Overall  crude  steel production capacity  1.n  the United  States  is unlikely to 
fall by  1985  since  some  reduction in integrated  steelmaking will  probably be 
offset by  the later development  of electric furnaces.  It seems  reasonable 
to  predict  a  capacity utilization of  close  to  80%  in 1985,  which  means 
that  production forecasts  are  slightly up.  A  similar annual  growth  rate 
for  consumption  does  not  seem  unrealistic in view of  the  prospect  of  a  cyclical 
take  off of  the  American  economy  in 1983.  An  adverse balance  of  trade  of 
40  million  tonnes  is close  to  the  average  recorded  over  the  past  five  years. 
Oceania 
As  Australia  1.s  an  expanding market  it seems  realistic to predict  a  slight 
increase  in production  and  consumption. 
The  producing  areas  having  a  structural  surplus will  remain  the  same  1.n  1985: 
the  countries  that are  forced  to  be net  exporters will still be  Japan  and  the 
Community. 
Against  this background  of world  production  and  consumption  trends,  it seems 
fair  to  predict  some  shrinkage  in the  extra-Community  trade  surplus  from 
23.9 million tonnes  in 1980  to  20.5 million tonnes  in 1985,  with  a  slight 
reduction  in the  gap  separating it from  the  Japanese  surplus  (see  Table  6). 
NET  STEEL  TRADE  BALANCES 
TABLE  6 
1975 
Western  Europe  (excl.EEC)  - 6,11 
Eastern  Europe  - 2,1 
Africa  - 5,5 
Middle  East  - 13,3 
Japan  +  37,5 
1  China/North  Korea  - 5,1 
Rest  of  Asia  - 8,9 
u  S  A  - 10,5 
Canada  - 0,3 
Latin  America  - 11,0 
Oceania  +  1,7 
E  E C  +  26,6 
Product  def1n1t1on.  Un1ted  Nat1ons 
('000  000  tonnesl 
1980 
- v,7 
- 1,2 
- 5,2 
- 14,3 
+  37,1 
- 6,2 
- 13,3 
- 13,1 
+  2,6 
- 7,8 
+  0,8 
+  23,9 
- - - net  1mporter 
+  = net  exporter 
1985 
0 
0 
- 5,0 
- 15,0 
+  30,0 
- 4,0 
- 12,0 
- 14,0 
+  3,5 
- 2,5 
+  o,s 
+  20,5 
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In  ECSC  products,  though  reduced,  the  balance could  remain  around  12  million 
tonnes  (see Table  7). 
THE  COMMUNITY'S  NET  BALANCE  OF  TRADE  WITH  NON-MEMBER  COUNTRIES 
TABLE  7 
('000  000  tonnes  of  finished products)  (1) 
1973  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1985 
Ingots  and  semis  -0,4  1,4  -0,3  -0,9  -0,8  -0,8  -0,3  -0,5 
Hat  coils  "'0,1  0,6  -0,8  1,3  2,7  2,4  2,2  2,5 
Heavy  sections  3,8  2,5  2,5  2,5  2,0  1,8  1,5 
Light  sections  4,6  2,2  1,6  1,4  3,2  3,7  2,3  1,9 
Wire  rod  1,4  1,0  0,4  0,6  1,0  1,1  0,7  0,8 
Strip  0,5  0,2  0,3  0,4  0,5  0,5  0,6  0,3 
Heavy  and  Light  plate  1,5  0,8  -0,2  0,6  1,6  1,2  0,9  0,9 
Uncoated  sheet  3,1  2,6  1,6  3,6  4,0  3,6  3,2  2,7 
Coated  sheet  2,3  1,8  1,7  1,7  2,0  1,9  1,5  2,0 
TOTAL  12,8  14,4  6,8  11,2  16,7  15,6  12,9  12,1 
( 1l  ECSC  Pr.oducts  Source.  EUROSTAT 
An  attempt  to  increase  the value of exports,  in order  to make  up  for  their low 
volume,  might  increase  the  favourable  balance  for  coated  sheet  by  a  third 
and  almost  double  the deficit  for  ingots  and  semis. 
In  1985,  the  largest  favourable  balances  should  be  for  coated  and  uncoated 
sheet  and  coils. 
In the medium  term,  the  improvement  of  the  Community's  external  trade balance 
will depend  on  its international  competitiveness.  It is then necessary 
to  stop  regarding  the  world  steel market  as  a  marginal  outlet mopping  up 
shortfalls in internal demand,  and  turn towards  strategies that explicitly 
include it, not  only in the  light of  export  prospects  but  also  as  the main 
yardstick for  the price  and  efficiency levels on  which  the  adjustment  of 
the whole  Community  steel  industry  should  be  based. 
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5.  Production 
a)  Finished products 
On  the  basis of  internal  consumption  and  external  trade  forecasts,  the output 
of  finished  products  in  terms  of  weight  is likely to  fall  by  3%  in 1985 
compared  to  1980. 
For  finished  rolled products,  this fall  would  be  limited  to  1%,  as  a  slightly 
higher output  of flat products  should  almost  make  up  for  the  reductions  1n 
heavy  and  light  sections  (see  also  explanatory table  in the  Annex). 
PRODUCTION  1974 ~  1980  & 1985 
LIQUID  STEEL  FOR  CASTING,  INGOTS  AND  SEMIS  FOR  SALE,  FINISHED  ROLLED  PRODUCTS 
TABLE  8 
('000  000  tonnes) 
PRODUCTS  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980 
STEEL  FOR  CASTING  (1)  2,1  2,0  1,8  1,6  1,6  1,6  1,6 
INGOTS  AND  SEMIS  FOR  SALE  (2)  10,5  1),0  9,7  9,1  11,3  11,5  11,2 
(x) 
FINISHED  ROLLED  PRODUCTS 
Coils  (finished products)  8,4  7,2  8,6  10,0  12,0  12,6  11,9 
Heavy  sections  10,5  8,9  9,0  8,7  9,3  8,8  8,4 
Light  sections  25,5  19,8  20,6  19,0  19,4  21,1  19,6 
of  which  concrete  reinforcing  rounds  (9,9)  (7  ,9)  (8,6)  (7'  7)  (7,7)  (8,8)  ( 8,  7) 
Wire  rod  12,8  9,2  10,4  10,2  11 '1  12,1  10,8 
Strip/tube strip  8,2  5,5  7,1  6,4  6,6  7,1  6,0 
Heavy  and  light  plate  17,6  14,5  12,5  12,3  12,6  13,0  12,5 
Sheet  29,3  21,7  26,8  27,4  28,0  29,2  26,3 
TOTAL  112,4  86,9  95,0  94,0  99,0  104,0  95,5 
GRAND  TOTAL  124,9  100,0  106,5  104,7  111,9  117,0  108,3 
(X) 
( 1)  Including  production  of  independent  steel  foundr1es. 
(2)  Excluding  those  for  rolling or  re-rolling  in  the  Community,  but  including  ingots  and  semis  for  tubes. 
(x)  Estimate  for  Germany. 
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1981  1985 
1,4  1,4 
9,1 
14,1  12,5 
8,5  7,2 
17,0  17,4 
(7,4)  ( 7  ,6) 
10,5  11, 1 
5,2  4,9 
12,8  12,5 
26,1  29,1 
94,2  94,6 
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b)  Crude  steel balance 
The  rapid  growth  in continuous  casting makes  it particularly difficult to 
compare  crude  steel output  from  one  year  to  another  because  of  the  savings 
in ingot  steel.  Over  a  long  period,  trends  in crude  steel production 
underestimate  the  real  increase  in finished  products. 
In  the  crude  steel balance,  continuous  casting production potential  for  1985 
is based  on  the  company  returns  corrected  by  the historical  trend.  One 
aim of the  Community  steel  industry must  be  to obtain  as  soon  as  possible 
a  maxLmum  continuous  casting output  amounting  to  some  85-90%  of  the 
necessary crude  steel production potential,  well  above  the  figure  of  68%  that 
can now  be  predicted for  1985. 
CRUDE  STEEL  BALANCE  TABLE  9 
c•ooo  boo  tonnes> 
1974  1975  1976  1977 
l.  INGOT  EQUIVALENT 
Consumption  (1)  131,2  1;1,4  124,2  117,8 
Variat~on in  stocks  (2)  +  1,0  - 1,1  + 5,7  - 1,1 
Exports  34,3  26,8  21,5  27,7 
Imports  7,4  7,8  12,4  12,5 
Scrap  consumption  in 
rolling mills  0,2  0,2  0,2  0,2 
Production  in  ingot  158,9  129,2  138,8  131,7  equi va:lent 
!I.  CORRESPONDING  CRUDE  STEEL  PRODUCTION 
. 
Conti nuou.s  casting  22,9  33,4  42,6  48,3 
production potential  (3) 
Continuous  easting  19,0  20,7  27,2  32,1 
production  (4) 
Continuous  casting 
correction  (5)  3,3  3,6  4,8  5,6 
Crude  steel production  (6)  155,6  125,6  134,0  126,1 
(1)  For  the  forecasting  years,  conversion  coefficient  equals  1.290. 
(2l  Stocks  held  by  producers  and  merchants. 
C3J  Figures  for  1985  are  estimates. 
1978  . 1979  1980 
118,1  125,~  120,7 
-.0,7  +.1,5  - 0  7 
33,2  32,1  211:3] 
11,1  11,5  11,5 
0,2  0,2  0,2 
139,3  14 7,8  136,6 
54,9  58,7  70,9 
38,6  43,7  50 
6,7  7,6  8,7 
132,6  140,2  127,9 
(4l  Assumed  rate of  utilization of production  potential  75  ~  in  1985. 
CSJ  savings  in  ingots  obtained by  continuous  casting  production:  continuous  casting output  x  0.175, 
(6)  Ingot  production  - continuous  casting  correction. 
. I. 
1985 
11'1,6 
-
15,6 
-
135,2 
110 
82,5 
14,4 
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6.  Raw  materials  and  scrap 
a)  Raw  materials 
By  1985  and  1990,  world  iron ore  output  could  develop  as  follows: 
TABLE  10 
IRON  ORE  PRODUCTION 
('000 000  tonnes) 
1980  1985  1990 
European  Community  35,2  28,2  27,0 
Sweden  28,5  26,0  25,0 
Rest  of  Europe  18,6  20,9  21,9 
U S  A  77,8  73,0  68,0 
Canada  51,2  50,0  50,0 
Brazil  91,5  102,0  140,0 
Mexico  and  rest  of  South  America  33,8  34,9  36,2 
Africa  64,6  71,8  92,6 
India  40,0  47,0  50,0 
Rest  of  Asia  2,0  2,1  2,8 
Australia  and  New  Zealand  106,0  106,0  112,0 
China  and  North  Korea  81,0  86,0  90,0 
u s s  R  249,0  260,0  270,0 
Other  State-trading  companies  11,7  14,6  14,5 
TOTAL  ROUNDED  OFF  895  930  1 .000 
With  a  safety margin of  10%,  the  supply  and  demand  balance  should  move 
towards  equilibrium point  after the  enormous  supply  surplus  of  1980. 
TABLE  11 
BALANCE  OF  SUPPLY  AND  DEMAND  FOR  IRON  ORE 
('000  000  tonnes) 
Supply  Demand 
1980  895  805 
1985  930  910  - 950 
1990  1 .000  1 .000  - 1.  050 
In  the  connnunity,  the  foresE\eable  trend  in steel output  should  in 1985  result 
in an  ore  demand  of between  1.40  and  150 Million  tonnes  compared  with  a 
consumption  of  146.8 Millidn  tonnes  in 1980. 
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Assuming  that  internal ore production falls  to  28.2 million  tonnes,  the balance 
to  be  covered  would  be  between  113.3  and  123.3 million tonnes  compared with 
actual  imports  of  115  million tonnesin  1980~ 
The  Community  steel  industry is now  participating directly in five  mining 
projects  in non-member  countries;  however,  most  of its supplies are guaranteed 
by  long-term supply  contracts.  There  seems  likely to  be  few  changes  in this 
situation  ~n the  immediate  future,  but  in  the medium  term  the  Community's 
financial  contribution to projects  in non-member  countries  could  be  an 
additional  factor helping  to  stabilize its supply. 
b)  Scrap 
To  cover  their  scrap  requirements,  companies  mainly use  their  own  circulating 
scrap.  Until  quite recently  this  source  accounted  for  50%  of  the  total 
Community  supply. 
This  proportion will,  however,  change  considerably with  the  spread  of 
continuous  casting,  which  reduces  own  scrap arisings.  The  installation of 
continuous  casting in a  typical  integrated works  on  average  increases  the 
need  for  bought  scrap  (+  115  kg  per  tonne  of  finished  product),  while 
the  combination of  continuous  casting with  an electric melting  shop  reduces 
the  need  for  bought  scrap  (-40 kg per  tonne  of  finished  products). 
Assuming  a  specific  scrap  consumption of  240  kg  in  LD  converters,  a  total 
continuous  casting weight  of  68%  (81%  for  electrical melting  shops  and 
64%  for  oxygen  steel plant)  and  supposing  that  26%  of  total  production  comes 
from electric melting  shops,  bought  scrap  requirements would  amount  to 
42.3 Million  tonnes  in 1985. 
BOUGHT  SCRAP  REQUIREMENTS  IN  1985 
TABLE  12 
( '000  000  t onnes 
Crude  steel  production  Products  Bought  scrap 
l:lought  Process  for  sale  required  per 
tonne  of  product  scrap 
Electric  31,0 of  which 
~25,0 continuous  casting  22,7  (1.069)  24,3 
6,0  in  ingots  4,7  (1.109)  5,2 
88,4 of  which  ~57  ,5  cent i nuous  casting  52,4  (  180)  9,4 
O~ygen  30,9  in  ingots  23,9  (  65)  1,6 
Steel  foundries  1,4  1,4  (  830)  1,2 
Blast  furnaces  0,6 
TOTAL  12(),8  1"20,8  103,7  42,3 
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Total  scrap  resources  available for  the  steel  industry ln  the  Community  should 
amount  to  41.8 million  tonnes  in  1985;  by  then,  supply  and  demand  should  be 
more  or  less  in balance. 
SCRAP  REQUIREMENTS  AND  RESOURCES  TABLE  13 
C'OOO  000  tonnes) 
!  Crude  steel  production 
i  Scrap  consumption 
I  Own  circulating  scrap  ------------ ---------------------------
Bought scrap requirements in steel plant 
Consumption  in  foundries 
Consumption  in  blast  furnaces 
---------------------------------------
Total  requirements 
1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1985  ------r------- ------r------- ------ ____ .;._ 
153,5  123,5  132,2  124,4  131,0  120,8 
64,7  54,1  57,7  55,0  59,1  59,4 
31,0  26,1  25,9  24,9  24,3  15,0 
------~------r-------r------r------ ------
33,7  28,0  31,8  30,1  24,8  40,5 
1,6  1,6  1,5  1,4  1,3  1,2 
2,2  1,8  1,7  1,6  1,4  0,6 
------i-------,...------r------l-------l"------
37,5  31,4  35,0  33,1  37,5  42,3 
1 5,  2  1 3,  9  14 .o  New _process  scrap  21  2  17  o  27,8 
Cap1tal  scrap  -----------------~---~------~---------~------1------- ------
~-~:~:~-~~~:~~:~-~::::~ces  36,4  30,9  41 ,8 
1;:~=~~:~:~~:-~:~-~:::~:~-:;-----------r--~:~-~--~:~--------r------- ------~--~~;-
\  internal  resources 
I 
7.  Energy 
In  terms  of quantity,  no  energy  supply difficulties are  expected  up  to  1985. 
The  more  complicated  and  relatively more  important  case  of blast  furnaces 
calls  for  more  detailed  comment. 
a)  Energy  consumption  in the blast  furnace 
Energy  consumption  in the  blast  furnace  (including  ore preparation)  fell  from 
23.7  gigajoules  per  tonne  of  pig  iron in 1974  to  22.9  gigajoules  in  1980,  a 
reduction  of  about  12%.  For  the  period  1981-85,  a  slow but  steady reduction 
in specific  energy  consumption may  again  be  expected;  it should  fall  by 
approximately  a  further  10%  to  a  level  of  around  19  gigajoules.  However,  gas 
and  electricity requirements will rise  from  2.24  gigajoules  in  1980  to 
2.4  gigajoules  in 1985  and  therefore  solid and  liquid  fuel  requirements 
should  amount  to  16.6  gigajoules per  tonne  of pig  iron  in  1985. 
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b)  Blast-furnace  energy supplies 
If the  injection of  liquid  and  gaseous  fuels  is abandoned,  around  42  million 
tonnes  of  coke will  be  required  to  cover pig  iron production requirements 
in 1985.  Coke-oven  operators  estimate that  the  Community's  coking  capacity 
should be  73  million  tonnes  a  year  by  1985,  with  an  output  of  up  to 
65  million  tonnes  adequate  to meet  demand  from  the  steel  and  other  industries 
and  for  exports. 
c)  Energy  conservation  (1) 
Energy  accounts  for  about  30%  of  steel production costs  in integrated  steelworks 
and  20%  in electrical melting  shops.  Its ultimate  impact  depends  on  energy 
prices  but  can  be  reduced  by  rational utilization;  the  energy  savings  obtainable 
in 1985  may  be  estimated at at least  7-8%  (5-6 million  tonnes  a  year)  of  1979 
consumption.  This will be  achieved  by: 
using  raw materials  that  are  optimum  from  the  energy viewpoint; 
- more  efficient energy management,  e.g.  heat  recovery; 
- returning to energy recovery  techniques  such as  the  recovery of  blast 
furnace  gas  from high top  pressure operation and  of  converter gas. 
8.  Excessive  imbalance  between  supply  and  demand 
Stagnating steel output  in the  Community  combined with  slack internal 
consumption and  an  industry not  competitive  enough  to  increase its exports 
would  not  in themselves  have  brought  about  the  structural  imbalance  if 
at  the  same  time  production capacity had  not  increased  substantially since 
1974,  leading to  a  serious  and  persistent  gap  between  supply  and  demand. 
a)  The  main causes of  the  imbalance 
The  capacity arose  from  a  combination of  specific capacity decisions  taken 
just before  the crisis hit and  gains  in productivity  from  restructuring and 
rationalization measures  taken as  soon as  the  structural nature  of  the 
crisis became  evident. 
i)  The  selling prices during  the  1973-74  boom  had  encouraged  many 
producers  to keep  in production or  even  to  restart marginal  and 
inefficient plants. 
ii)  During the  same  period,  extensive investment  programmes  to  increase 
capacity had  been decided  on  since  demand  was  expected  to  continue 
growing;  it is estimated  that  these  programmes  led  to  a  net  capacity 
increase  of  about  15%  over  1973. 
/ 
( 
(1)  The  Community  steel 
consumption  in the 
'  ,. 
injlustry 
'\ /  . 
Connwm~  ty 
I 
accounts  for  about  8%  of  total primary energy 
and  20%  of  consumption  by  industry. 
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iii) The  restructuring and  rationalization measures  taken  since  1975  have 
produced  a  leap  forward  ~n plant productivity.  Between  1972  and  1980 
tonnage yield  increased by  an  average  of  47%  for blast furnaces, 
oxygen  converters  and  arc furnaces,  697.  for  continuous  casting and 
105%  for  strip mills.  With  production  remaining  steady,  this 
improvement  in productivity released  capacity  surpluses  that  alone 
more  than cancelled  out  plant  closures. 
Since  1974,  therefore,  enormous  imbalances  have  been  created between  supply 
and  demand  in all  the  main  product  categories.  On  average  installed 
production capacity has  exceeded  by  23%  for  crude  steel  and  27%  for  finished 
products  the  theoretical  capacity required  to meet  production requirements 
at utilization rates of  85%  and  80%  respectively.  In  1980  and  1981,  these 
structural surpluses worsened  (see  Table  14). 
TRENDS  IN  SURPLUS  PRODUCTION  CAPACITY 
T~BLE  14 
('000  DUO  tonnes  and  Y.l 
Year  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980 
Products  t  X  t  X  t  ;(  t  Y.  t  I  Y.  t  Y.  t  X 
I  CRUDE  STEEL  -4,0  -2,2  42,0  22,1  39,9  20,2  52,3  26,1  46,1  22,8  37,9  18,6  52,1  25,7 
II  FINISHED  PRODUCTS 
Light  and  heavy  sections  0,4  0,8  11,7  23,0  11,8  22,9  13,2  26,3  12,6  24,9  9,6  19,6  12,1  24,7 
(+  tube  semis) 
wire  rod  -0,6  -3,9  5,0  30,7  3,7  22,2  4,8  27,3  4,8  24,3  3,1  16,4  4,8  25,1 
Strip  and  tube  strip  0,6  5,5  4,1  37,3  3,0  25,2  4,0  33,3  4,1  33,1  3,2  26,2  4,0  34,8 
Hot-rolled  sheet  & plate  0,3  1,3  5,7  23,7  9,2  36,7  10,8  40,9  11,3  41,2  9,9  35,5  10,2  37,1 
Cold-rolled  sheet  & plate  1,8  4,8  13,5  33,4  8,0  19,4  8,8  20,6  8,2  19,1  7,5  17,1  11,6 26,1 
~  2,3  1,7  39,8  27,9  35,6  24,3  42,0  28,2  41,0  27,0  33,6  22,1  42,8 
II l  COILS  -1,5  -2,7  18,5  30,2  9,6  15,2  12,0  17,9  9,3  13,7  7,9  11,3  16,0 
N.B.  The  assumed  utilization  rate  1s  85%  for  crude  steel  and  BOY.  for  f1n1shed  products. 
Consequently  the  Community  steel  industry has  been  unable  to  adapt  its 
structures  to  a  market  no  longer exhibiting high  and  lasting growth,  but 
showing  more  and  more  signs  of  instability. 
b)  Wider  adverse effects 
28,3 
21,9 
It is not  so  much  sluggish demand  as  investment  decisions  (which  have  not 
been corrected or  compensated  by  shutting  down  marginal  plant)  and 
improved  productivity  (substantial  but  insufficient  to  restore  real 
competitiveness)  that must  be  blamed  fo/c- creating  this vicious  circle, 
the harmful  impact  of which  is  intoler/~ble for  several  reasons: 
/ 
./. 
1981 
t  Y. 
50,6  25,6 
12,0  24,3 
6,2  32,1 
4,3  39,8 
11,3  40,9 
11,7  26,S 
45,7  30,2 
15,3 20,8 - 35  -
i)  Utilization rates have  declined  substantially in the  Community.  For 
crude  steel,  they have  dropped  from  87%  in 1974  to  an  average  of  65% 
since  that date,  and  there was  a  further fall  in 1980-81.  Compared  to 
a  theoretical utilization of  100%,  the  specific  impact  of  these  rates 
may  be  estimated  to  add  around  22%  to  operating costs  (excluding  financial 
costs  and  taxes),  a  burden equivalent  to  the  cost  difference  between 
the  lowest  effective utilization rate  (55%)  and  the  highest  (95%). 
Over  that  period,  therefore,  the  Community  industry was  at  a  great 
disadvantage  in comparison  to  the  US  industry,  which  succeeded  in 
maintaining  a  capacity utilization of  between  85  and  90%.  Although 
the Japanese  industry experienced  a  similar fall  to  the  Community,  it 
managed  to  reduce  the  impact  substantially by  achieving major  impro-
vements  ~n performance  for  the  other  prime  cost  components;  at present 
the  break-even point  in Japan  ~s close  to  a  capacity utilization of  60%. 
ii)  The  average  technical  quality of  the plant  has  suffered because obsolete 
plant  has  been kept  in service,  and  as  a  result plant  replacement  and 
modernization  is lagging behind  the  Japanese  industry,  which  has  shut 
down  much  obsolete  capacity and  replaced it with modern  plant  (the  figures 
for  1977  to mid-1979,  for  example,  were  -23.2  and  +22.6  million tonnes 
respectively).  The  percentage of plant classified as  technically 
obsolete  by  international  standards  is much  higher  in  the  Community 
than in Japan,  while  the  reverse  situation is found  for  technically 
excellent  plant  (1).  In  terms  of  operating costs,  the difference 
between  excellent  and  obsolete  plant  is  on  average  around  25%: 
together with  the  capacity utilization rate,  this  has  the  greatest 
unit  impact.  Even  though  the  ECSC  industry has  got  rid of  its basic 
THOMAS  converters  and  almost  all of its open-heart  furnaces,  light 
plate and  sheet mills,  there  are  large  gaps  between  the  average 
technical  levels in the  Community  and  Japan  for  the  main  phases 
of the steel production process  (T~ble 15). 
(1)  The  plant  in 62  steel  companies  accounting  for  88%  of  Community  ordinary 
steel output  in 1979-80  have  been  compared  with  that  of Japanese  companies 
accounting for  a  similar percentage  of  Japanese  output.  For  each  stage  in 
the  production cycle,  specific evaluation criteria  (age,  dimension,  special 
characteristics affecting plant  efficiency),  weighted  according  to  their 
impact  on  competitiveness,  have  been  used  to  classify plant  at  five  levels 
of  technical  performance  ranging  from  excellent  to poor. 
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TECHNICAL  LEVEL  OF  STEEL  PLANT  IN  THE  COMMUNITY  AND  IN  JAPAN  IN  1980  (*) 
Total  capacities  :i  of  capacity  classified as: 
Type  of  plant  examined  1+  1- 2+  2  <million  tonnesl  <excel lent)  (average) 
BLAST  FURNACE·S  E E  C  132,8  20  13  12  22 
JAPAN  156  1  58  15  12  7 
OXYGEN  CONVERTERS  E E  C  53,6  36  37  23  5 
JAPAN  64  6  51  35  10  4 
WIDE  HOT  STRIP  MILLS  E E  C  70  23  16  32  24 
JAPAN  53  4  42  31  9  12 
PLATE  MILLS  E  E C  15,2  20  8  24  35 
JAPAN  21  2  82  10  8  0 
E  E  C  34,2  8  26  29  27 
COLD  ROLLING  MILLS  JAPAN  23,2  44  23  10  17 
C•)  In  some  cases  the  most  recent  data  available  on  mills  date  from  1977. 
The  gap  is particularly large for blast furnaces,  which  account  for 
around  60%  of production costs  (excluding depreciation and  financial 
costs)  at  the  semis  stage;  in the  Community  their average  productivity 
TABLE  15 
3 
(poor) 
32 
8 
0 
0 
5 
5 
13 
0 
10 
6 
is only one-third  that  in Japan,  mainly  because  of  their  smaller  dimensions 
and  lower  energy yield. 
In  continuous  casting  too,  the  Community  is lagging well  behind  at  only  39% 
production  compared  with  71%  in Japan.  Because  of  its more  recent 
introduction and  the  scattered installations,  continuous  casting in  the 
Community  is also at  a  cost  disadvantage  compared  to  Japan,  estimated 
at about  12%  for  a  sample  representing  65%  of  total  continuous  casting 
capacity. 
The  only  Community  installations  that are  technically more  efficient 
than in Japan  are electric furnaces.  Overall,  the  percentage  of 
obsolete plant  in  the  Community's  total production capacity is 
approximately equivalent  to  the  capacity surplus,  so  that  the  degree 
of modernization of  the plant  sufficient to  meet  demand,  provided  the 
most  efficient plant  is selected,  is  remarkably  close  to  that  of  the 
Japanese  and  well  above  that  of  the  North  American  steelmakers. 
iii) Although the  incidence  of  surplus  capacity on  costs varies  according 
to  the  structure of  the  company  concerned  and  although it can be 
offset at microeconomic  level  by  savings  on  other  costs  factors,  its 
adverse effect on  selling prices is widespread  and  persistent. 
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Because of  the narrow gross margins  1n  the  industry,  any  change  in the  relation 
between prices  and  costs has  a  major  impact  on  company  results.  This  is what 
happened  in the  Community  up  to mid-1981:  the  companies'  efforts  to  increase 
sales  so  as  to  share  fixed  costs  caused  them  to  base  prices  on marginal 
rather than total  costs.  The  widening  gap  between total costs  and  those 
selling prices was  reflected in the  final  disastrous  results. 
In  the  Community,  the  combination of  adverse  factors  more  or  less directly 
linked  to  surplus  capacity is therefore  intolerable:  from  the cost aspect 
alone,  the cumulative disadvantage  in terms  of operating costs  from  the 
combination of  obsolete plant  and  rock  bottom utilization rates  (55%), 
compared  to  the  combination of  excellent plant  and  a  peak effective utilization 
rate  (95%),  is on  average  about  47%  and  may  go  up  to  60%. 
To  have  an  idea of  the  relative  importance  of  these  two  factors  it is 
·s~ffl.cient  to  compare  them  with other variables:  the  gap  between  European 
and  Japanese  average  hourly  labour  costs  adds  an  average  of  7%  to  operating 
costs,  while  the difference  between  energy costs  for  Community  producers 
(including  subsidies)  and  for American producers  amounts  to  an  insignificant 
disadvantage of  1%. 
To  judge  from  the  1981  investment  survey  in the  Community  and  the  production 
needed  to.meet  foreseeable  demand,  the overall  imbalances  between  demand 
and  supply will continue.  In 1985  they  could  amount  to  29%  for  crude:steel 
and  32%  for  finished  products,  ranging  from  43%  for  strip and  hot-rolled 
sheet  to  20%  for cold-rolled  sheet  (Tables  16  and  17,  see  page  38). 
It is true  that  these  figures  do  not  take  into account  closures  already 
planned  under  the  regulations  on  aid  to  the  steel  industry,  but  so  far 
these closures  are  insufficient to modify  the results  significantly.  Any 
overestimate in  the  declared  capacity  so  as  to  have  higher  quotas  under 
the crisis  scheme  would  not  be  of  a  sufficient  volume  to  reduce  the  gravity 
of  the  situation. 
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BALANCE  BETWEEN  SUPPLY  AND  DEMAND  - 1985 
TABLE  16 
( '000  UOU  tunnes) 
Necessary  roduc t. 
Prod.  Surplus  capacity  Estimated  production  potential  Rate  a f  Rate  of 
Product ion  potent. 
product ion  potential  announced  utilization  PRODUCTS  198o  198o  1985  1985  1995  198o 
(1) 
I.  CRUDE  STEEL  127,7  204,8  120,8  142,1  200,1  62,4 
II.  FJNJSHED  PRODUCTS 
Heavy  sections  8,4  15,7  7,2  9,0  15,6  53,5 
Light  sections  !0,9  18,1  9,8  12,3  19,3  6o,o 
Cone rete  reinforcing  rounds  8, 7  U,7  7,6  9.5  12,5  63,5 
Wire  rod  10,8  17,6  11,1  l3.9  19,7  61,4 
Strip  6,0  11,5  4,9  6,1  10,7  52,2 
of  ~o~h i ch  EXTRA  SPEC.  (4,3)  (7,9)  (2,5)  (3,1)  (6,5)  (54,8) 
Hot-rolled  sheet  &  plate  (2)  12, 6  27,6  12,7  15,9  27,9  45,7 
of  which  EXTRA  SPEC.  (9, 7)  (19,2)  (7. 6)  (9,5)  (19,0)  (50, 7) 
Cold-rolled  sheet  & plate  26,2  44,4  28,9  )6, 1  45,2  59,1 
TOTAL  (3)  8),6  148,5  82,1  102,6  150,9  56,) 
III. WJOE  STR JP  45,3  72,9  52,1  65,1  76,5  62,1 
at  which  CoiLs  tor  st itt  ing  (11,9)  ( 17. 2)  12,5  15,6  19,5  69,4 
{1) Assuming  a  rate  of  utilization of  85%  for  crude  steel  and  BOY.  for  finished  rotted  products. 
C2>  Including strip  and  hot  sheet  from  coils. 
(J) Not  including  coils  fur  slitting~ 
BALANCE  BETWEEN  SUPPLY  AND  DEMAND  fOR  COILS  - 1985 
c  ~  c  c  c 
c  I 
0  a~  0  >-a~  -oo~ 
0  ·;;  L  ·.- ttl 
~ ·:  .~ 
~  ::  8  ~  ~ ·:  -~  "0  c  u  ~  0  N  PRODUCTS  0  -"'  ~ 
~  ~ 0  c  0  0  c  '0  E  - >  "' "0  "'  0  "0  "'  ..  ~ 
~ e  "'c  E  ~ ·~  uo~  c  0  ·~  ~·~  8 8  "'0 0  "'~ 0  c  ~  0  ~ ~  a.-
"'- u  z  0.0.  <CO.O. 
"'  0 
Coils  as  finished  pro  duets  12,5  1,00  12,5  15,6  19,5  64,1 
Strip  (1)  2,5  1,05  2,6  3,3 
Hot-rolled  sheet  (2)  5,1  1,07  5,5  6,9 
Cold-rolled  sheet  ___ ?~!?  __  ___ }LQ? __  --~!!~--- --~~!~--
fOTAL  49,0  52,1  65,1  76,5  68,1 
(1)  50  X  of total strip production. 
(2!  40  X  at total  hot-rolled  sheet  production. 
utilization 
1985 
Tonnage 
8ll4  58,0 
46,2  6,6 
50,8  7,0 
(t), 8  3,0 
56,3  ;,8 
4;,8  4,6 
(38,5)  (3,4) 
45,.)  12,0 
(40,0)  (9,5) 
63,9  9,1 
54,4  48,3 
68,1  11,4 
64,1  3, 9 
<  •ooo  OUO  tonne-s) 
Surplus  capaclty 
Tonnage 
3, 9  20,0 
11,4  14,9 
If the  trends  now  apparent  continue,  the  prospect  is  that  the  vicious 
circle of  surplus  capacity,  rising costs  and  falling  prices,  financial 
difficulties and  loss  of  competitiveness will  become  firmly  established  and 
will probably even worsen  jeopardizing all  the  effort put  in and  progress 
made  so  far  by  the most  dynamic  companies. 
./. 
1985 
,; 
29,0 
42,) 
36,3 
24,0 
29,4 
43,0 
(52,3) 
43,0 
(5C,v) 
20,1 
32,0 
14,9 
20,0 - 39  -
Up  to  1985,  the  structural adjustment  effort must  be  strictly concentrated, 
both directly and  indirectly,  on  breaking  this  harmful  spiral by  acting 
on  its key  factor,  surplus  capacity. 
9.  Factors  govern~ng competitiveness 
After  1985,  with demand  expected  to  remain weak  up  to  1990  and  worldwide 
competition growing  ever keener,  assuming  that  a  free  trade  system  is 
maintained,  the  position and  growth of  each  steel industry will  depend  more 
and  more  on  its competitivness. 
That  is why  the  urgent  streamlining must  be  carried  out  before  1985  so  that 
the  industry can move  on  to  tackle efficiently the full  range  of  factors 
affecting competitiveness. 
Average  evaluations  of  competitiveness may  often conceal  very different 
or  even diverging situations  from  one  company  to another,  and  this is 
the  case  in the  Community.  Nevertheless  the  compilation of  average  figures 
for  the  Community  can yield  information that  is useful  in assessing  the 
prevailing features  that  largely determine  the  functioning  and  performance 
of  the  Community  steel  industry,  through  the  effect of  the  ties of 
interdependence within  the  common  market. 
At  present  the  Community  industry  ~s  ~n a  position of inferiority compared 
to other producers  in  too  many  of  the  key factors  governing  competitiveness 
and  in addition,  it has  not  succeeded  in  reaching  a  predominant  position 
in any of  the  three  basic  categories:  availability of markets,  management  of 
resources  and  industry environment  (Table  18). 
KEY  FACTORS  GOVERNING  COMPETITlVNESS 
KEY  FACTORS 
- Internal  market  AVAILABILITY  1. 
OF  MARKETS  - Export 
- Input  costs 
'' 
MANAGEMENT  - Technology/ 
Of  KEY  2.  production  facilities 
INDUSTRY 
RESOURCES  - Capacity  utilization 
- Industry  structure 
- Employment/social 
INDUSTRY  - financial  3. 
ENVIRONMENT  - Governmental 
+  Europe  better  than  other  country 
0  =  Europe  about  the  same  as  other  country 
=  Europe  slightly worse  than  other  country 
Europe  substantially~orse than  other  country 
-
-
- -
- - -
Raw  materials 
Energy 
Labor 
I ronmak i ng_ 
Steelmaking 
Primary  forming 
Rolling/finishing_ 
i 
J 
/ 
PRODUCERS 
u S  A  JAPAN 
+  -
0  -
+  -
0  0 
+  0 
0  --
+  -Ia 
+lo  --
a  -lo  -- 0 
0  0 
- -
0  0 
a  -
OTHERS 
--
-
0 
0  --
I 
-
., 
-I+  ~  •. 
-
-I+ 
-
--
'  /,. 
L-------------------~~--------------------~·~.~t'-----------------------------------------1 
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The  Community  position is overall  weaker  than  that  of  Japan  and  other producers, 
while on  the  whole  it is  slightly better than that  of  the United  States. 
An  individual  look at  the  maln factors  gives  a  much  better  idea  of  recent 
trends  and,  where  appropriate,  of  the  foreseeable  or  necessary  approach  in 
order to  improve  the  efficiency of  Community  producers. 
a)  Availability of markets:  a  question of  volume  but  also  of price 
Between  1975  and  1980  internal  demand  in the  Community  grew much  less  than 
in Japan,  although more  than  in the United  States.  Trends  between  1980  and 
1985  appear  likely to be  even  less  satisfactory,  as  an  approximately constant 
level  in the  Community  could  be  accompanied  by  average  growth  rates  of 
around  1.5%  a  year  in Japan  and  the  United  States. 
Real  prices  ln the  Community  have  fluctuated  fairly widely,  but  show  a 
downward  trend over  the  period  1974-81  of  2.2%  a  year  (Figure 1). 
100 
80 
60 
TREND  IN  REAL  PRICES  IN  THE  COMMUNITY 
naexY 
FIGURE  1 
(Covering  full  costs)  -------- .... 
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(Covering  marg~al  ~stsl 
74  75  76  77  78  79  80  81  82  83  84  85  86 
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The  production quota  scheme  pushed  prices up  considerably between mid-1981 
and  mid-1982:  at present  the  level  is  sufficient  to  cover  the  total production 
costs of an average  firm. 
It seems  that  the  close  link between prices  and  production costs will 
be maintained,  and  the  2%  downward  trend  should  continue between mid-1982 
and  1986;  companies  are  now  starting to  incorporate  this  trend in their 
restructuring plans.  The  balanced  scenario which predicts  that  this  trend 
will appear  from mid-1982  levels  is based  on  the hypothesis  that  the  quota 
system will  shortly be  followed  by  a  capacity reduction  in line with 
market  requirements;  in that  case prices  could  continue  to  cover  total 
costs.  If surplus  capacity is not  cut  back,  the  quota  system will  gradually 
become  less effective while  prices will  fall still further,  down  to  the  level 
of marginal  costs. 
On  export markets,  cut-throat  international  competition means  that  on  the  whole 
sales volumes  are  less  stable  and  prices  lower  than  on  domestic markets. 
In this respect  Community  producers,  like Japanese  producers,  are  and  will 
continue  to  be  at  a  disadvantage  in comparison  to United States producers, 
who  are far  less  dependent  on  exports. 
In general,  sluggish and  variable  demand  will make  it even more  important 
to  deploy efficient marketing  strategies focusing  not  only  on  prices but 
also on product  quality,  reliable deliveries  and  good  before  and  after 
sales services;  there  is evidence  to  show  that in these fields  Community 
producers are  less efficient  than  the  Japanese. 
b)  Management  of resources:  the  real key  to  comparative  advantage 
Although all steel  producers  have  been affected  by  sluggish  demand  and 
cut-throat price  competition,  there have  been  significant differences  in 
the management  of  the  production process,  most  components  of  which  are 
under  the direct control  of  the  company. 
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Amongst  input  costs,  only  in unit  labour costs is the Community  at  a 
disadvantage over Japan,  although it is better placed  than  the American 
industry. 
However,  differences  in competitiveness  are  essentially  governed  less  by 
factor prices  than by  prodocutivity levels. 
Physical  labour productivity has  increased,  substantially in the  Community 
slnce  1975  (+5.4%  a  year),  mainly  as  a  result of  reductions  in  employment 
since  1974  (Figure  2). 
PRODUCTIVITY  TRENDS  IN  THE  COMMUNITY 
Tonnes/man/year 
230 
200 
-
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+1.3X a year---- /  -- /  --
_FIGURE  2 
1970  71  72  73  74  75  76  77  78  79  80  81 
Over  the  decade,  the  substantial decline  recorded  between  1972  and  1975 
drastically reduced  the productivity  growth rate  to  +1.3%  a  year.  In 
1980,  the  Japanese  steel  industry was  way  ahead  of  the  Community  steel 
industry in terms  of management  of  resources,  as  is  shown  in the  average 
figures  for material yield energy  consumption  and  hourly productivity: 
for  1  tonne  of  finished  product,  the  Community  needs  8%  more  crude  steel, 
28%  more  energy  and  almost  twice  as  many  man  hours  as  Japan  (Figure  3) • 
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PRODUCTIVITY  AND  ENERGY  CONSUMPTION  IN  THE  COMMUNITY  AND  JAPAN 
JAPAN  1. 09 tIt 
E E C  1.18 t/t 
JAPAN  18  GJ /t 
E E C  23  GJ/t 
JAPAN~~ 
E E C 
Source:  EUROSTAT 
FIGURE  3 
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(All  products 
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Because  the  Community  is  lagging  behind it is at  a  disadvantage  over Japan in 
terms  of production costs.  The  large  increase  in real  costs  recorded  in the 
ECSC  in 1976  widened  the  gap  between  Community  and  Japanese  cost levels. 
Between  1970  and  1980,  the  average  annual  reduction in costs  in the  Community 
was  1.4%,  only half  the  reduction in Japanese  costs  (-2.7%)  (Figure  4). 
TREND  IN  REAL  COSTS  IN  THE  COMMUNITY  . 
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On  the basis of known  investment  and  restructuring plans,  it now  seems 
that unit costs  in the  Community  are  likely to  fall  by  2%  a  year  on 
average  up  to  1985.  Compared  to  the  fall  of  2.4%  recorded  in the  Community 
since  1976  and  the  reduction of  over  3%  in Japan  for  the  same  period, 
this does  not  seem  enough  to  allow the  Community  eventually to  catch up 
with Japan. 
Investment  1s closely related  to  costs  and  productivity within  the  company. 
Investment  tended  to  decline  in the  Community  steel  industry from  1970  to 
1980:  in 1979,  it reached  rock bottom at  15  ECU  per  tonne  of  finished 
product,  less  than half  the  1971  figure.  Since  investment  costs have 
increased  substantially in the meantime,  the real  impact  of  this 
expenditure is very much  weakened. 
Investment  1n  the  Community  falls far  behind  that  of  the  Japanese  steel 
industry,  but  is above  the  level  of  North  American  producers.  For 
example,  over  the  period  1976-77  the  Japanese  invested  79  ECU  per  tonne 
produced  compared  to  only  22  ECU  in the  Community  and  19  ECU  in the  USA. 
It will  take  a  determined  and  well-planned effort to  make  up  the  cumulative 
advantage  enjoyed  by  the  Japanese,  especially as  the  staggering rise in 
plant costs,  set against  flagging  selling prices,  is steadily increasing  the 
cost  and  risk of  investment  decisions. 
c)  An  industrial structure more  fragmented,  less  integrated  downstream and 
less diversified  than  in Japan  and  the  United  States 
Mergers,  downstream  integration and  diversification are  the main  strategies 
used  for  the  offensive  or defensive  adjustment  of production  structures 
to  demand. 
It is 1n  the  degree  of concentration of  the  steel  industry  that  the  Community 
falls farthest  behinds  its competitors:  at  the  end  of  the  1970s  the  five 
largest  companies  accounted  for  less  than  50%  of  ECSC  output,  more  than 
60%  of American  output  and  more  than  70%  of Japanese  output.  In  1980, 
29  integrated companies  in  the  Community  produced  93.3 million tonnes  of 
crude  steel  in 49  production centres while  five  integrated  companies  in 
Japan  produced  84.2 Million tonnes  in 18  centres. 
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Although  the  results of  the  latest merger  operations  in  the  Community  are 
not  unequivocal,  it must  nevertheless  be  emphasized  that  compared  to  the 
structures of  the  American  steel  industry and  above  all the Japanese 
industry,  which was  founded  in the  1960s,  the  streamlining of  the  Community 
industry cannot  be  confined  to measures  within each  company,  but must  seek 
the maximum  possible  synergy between different producers. 
d)  Financial  imbalance:  a  consequence  rather  than  a  cause  of unsatisfactory 
performance 
.The  indebtedness  of  the  Japanese  companies  is very high,  above  the  Community 
average,  while  in the  USA  companies  rely far more  on  their  own  funds. 
Until near  the  end  of  the  1970s,  the  impact  of  interest costs on  sales 
of  the  ECSC  companies,  although higher  than  1n  American  companies,  was 
well  below that  in Japan. 
-
TABLE  19 
INTEREST  COSTS  AS  X OF  SALES 
, 976  1978 
E  E  C  4,5  4,4 
JAPAN  7,0  6,5 
UNITED  STATES  1,4  1,5 
Source  Annual  reports.  Coverage  70X  of  the  1ndustry's sales 
Since  interest rates  took  a  less  favourable  turn in the  Community  than in 
Japan,  the  average  cost  of  indebtedness  in  the  ECSC  overtook that  of  the 
Japanese  companies  1n 1977-78.  More  recently,  the  gap  with Japan has 
widened  significantly and  remains  substantial with  the  United  States. 
However,  the  real  cause  of  the  financial  difficulties that  have  affected 
ECSC  producers,  unlike  Japanese  and  US  producers,  is not  so  much  the 
rising interest  rates  as  the  steady  increase  in the debt  as  a  result of 
continuing  losses. 
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Overall,  the  18  leading  Community  companies  (1)  have  made  a  loss  since  1974 
while  the  main  Japanese  and  US  firms  have  made  profits,  the  latter 
relatively large ones.  These  results  are mainly  due  to  the  operating 
efficiency,  as  shown  below  by  way  of  example  for  1976  and  1978. 
TABLE  20 
PROFIT  BEFORE  INTEREST  AND  TAX  AS  X OF  SALES 
1976  1978 
E E C  3,4  1,6 
UNITED  STATES  6,4  6,0 
JAPAN  9,8  7,8 
Source  see  Table  17 
On  the  basis of  these results,  only  the  Japanese  firms  have  succeeded  in 
achieving  a  net  cash  flow  adequate  to maintain  and  strengthen viability while 
the  Community  companies  on  average  have  barely been  able  to  cover  their 
operating costs  and  have  been  unable  to  pay  financial  charges,  taxes,  shareholders 
and  provide  for  future  investment. 
Figures  taken  from  1977  annual  reports  provide  a  significant  example  (Figure  5). 
FIGURE  5 
NET  CASH  FLO~ as  percentage of  sales• 
9 x  __________________________________________________  ___ 
7.4  Y. 
7  VIABILITY  REQUIREMENT  •• 
EEC 
JAPAN  USA 
-2.0 X 
•  Profits  retained,  plus  depreciation. 
•• Net  cash  flow  required  to  replace or  modernize  plant  without  increasing  capacity. 
***  Excluding  Bethlehem,  the  USA  perce~tage would  have  been  4.5  for  1977. 
Source  :  Annual  reports 
In  the  Community  steel  industry,  the  fact  that  industrial management  is 
incapable  of generating  sufficient  revenue  to  remunerate  all  the  resources 
employed  has  led  to  the  erosion of  capital  and  snowball  effects which make 
any  attempts  to  revitalize  the  industry even more  arduous. 
(1)  The  7  German  firms  in this  group  have  succeeded  ~n maintaining  a 
situation of  balance. 
. I. A N N E X 
A.  GENERAL  METHODOLOGY  FOR  THE  PREPARATION  OF  FORECASTS 
1.  The  following  have  been prepared  for  the  Community  on  the  basis of studies 
conducted  in each country on  consumption in the user branches  between  1970 
and  1978. 
a)  A table of steel consumption  by  products  and  by  sector for  1978,  taken as  the 
reference year  for  forecasting  (ordinary steel and  special  steels). 
b)  Sectoral  tables  showing  the  trend  in specific consumption between 1970  and 
1978  for  each type  of product 
steel  consumption  kg  steel 
cs  = 
production  tonne of product 
For  the total  (EUR  9),  the  specific consumption of  each country has  been 
weighted by  steel consumption  each year  between 1970  and  1977. 
c)  Series of  activity indices,  by  user  sector,  using a  statistical data base 
recorded  in  the  form  of  time  series and  managed  by  the  CRONOS  system.  These 
indices based  on  1975  100 are  indices  of value  added  at factor  costs  and 
constant prices.  For  three sectors,  these activity indices were  calculated 
as  follows: 
+  "other consumers":  production  indices weighted  by  consumption in 1970 
+  "shipyards":  compensated  gross  registered  tonnage  indexes  (1  000) 
+  "manufacture of  tubes
11
:  production indices. 
2.  The  figures  given for  1985  represent  the  trend  level established as  follows: 
a)  Forecasts  for  the  development  of  activity in  the  sectors  are based  on 
the  relations between  this activity and  the  evolution expected  for  the 
period  1980-85  of the main macro-economic variables: 
1.  GDP 
2.  Private  and  public  consumption 
3.  Gross  fixed  capital  formation 
4.  Industrial production; 
These macro-economic  trends were  established in the  fifth medium-term 
economic  policy programme  drafted by  the  Commission  in cooperation with  the 
Member  States; 
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b)  Forecasts  of  consumption  by products  are made  by  applying  to  the activity 
of  the  user  sectors specific steel  consumption coefficients obtained  from 
the historical  trend,  where  necessary corrected in accordance with  the 
latest developments. 
B.  EXPLANATORY  TABLE  OF  PRODUCTION  FORECASTS 
The  following  points  concerning  the  product  categories  in Table  8  should  be  noted: 
a)  There  has  been no  independent  forecast  for  coils as  finished  products. 
Production for  1985  is established by  assuming  that  the  breakdown  of  1980 
demand  amongst  heavy  and  light plate,  sheet  and  coils will  remaln  unchanged. 
In the  light of past  trends,  it is probable  that  this will  slightly 
underestimate  production but  the effect will not  be  significant.  In  that 
case,  hot-rolled wide  strip production will  be  slightly overestimated  because 
of  the  increased  demand  for  sheet  or  light  and  heavy plate  owing  to  the 
fact  that more  material  is  lost  in  the  working  of  these  products  than  in the 
case  of  coils  as  finished  products. 
b)  Similarly,  the  forecast  for  concrete  reinforcing  round  production is based 
on  a  more  or  less constant  share of  this product within  the  light  section 
category. 
c)  The  heavy  andlight  plate  and  sheet  categories  include hot  and  cold-rolled 
products.  The  following  table  shows  the  breakdown  between hot  and  cold-rolled 
sheet  and  plate,  once  again assuming  that  the  structure will  remain  unchanged 
from  the  previous  period.  Since  the  quantities  involved  are very  small,  this 
distinction is only of  interest for  the  accurate  calculation of cold-rolled 
plate and  sheet  demand. 
PRODUCTION  OF  PLATE  AND  SHEET  1974  TO  1980  AND  1985 
PRODUCTS 
HEAVY  AND  LIGHT  PLATE 
- hot-rolled 
- cold-rolled 
SHEET 
- hot-rolled 
- coLd-rolled 
TOTAL  COLO-ROLLED  PLATE  AND  SHEET 
TOTAL  HOT-ROLLED  PLATE  AND  SHEET 
1974 
17,575 
17,450 
0,125 
29,269 
0,559 
28,710 
1975  1976  1977 
14,494  12,526  12,262 
14,382  12,366  12,097 
o, nz  0,160  0,165 
21,731  26,766  27,374 
0,291  0,320  0,390 
21,440  26,446  26,98.4 
('000  DOD  tonnesl 
1978  1979  1980  1985 
12,601  13,005  12,461  12,6 
12,414  12,822  12,265  12,4 
0,187  0,183  0,196  0,3 
28,032  29,248  26,332  31,1 
0,454  0,451  0,335  0,4 
27,578  28,797  25,997  30,7 
26,193  30,9 
12,600  ~ 